

# Current History

AUG 25 1993

Property of

Ambassador College Library  
Sandy, TX 75755

THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

BLUE MOUNTAIN COLLEGE LIBRARY

## Nationalism in the Middle East

THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC . . . . .	<i>Charles Issawi</i>	65
ISRAELI POLICY FOR SURVIVAL . . . . .	<i>Dwight J. Simpson</i>	70
NATIONALISM IN JORDAN . . . . .	<i>Raphael Patai</i>	77
THE REVOLUTION IN IRAQ . . . . .	<i>Sir John Troutbeck</i>	81
TURKISH NATIONALISM IN THE POSTWAR WORLD		
	<i>Ellen D. Ellis</i>	86
NATIONALISM IN SAUDI ARABIA . . . . .	<i>K. S. Twitchell</i>	92
THE DYNAMICS OF LEBANESE NATIONALISM .	<i>Maurice Harari</i>	97
CURRENTS IN IRANIAN NATIONALISM . . .	<i>Robert J. Pranger</i>	102
MAP OF THE MIDDLE EAST . . . . .		75
WORLD DOCUMENTS		
The Soviet Proposal for a Free Berlin . . . . .		107
RECEIVED AT OUR DESK . . . . .		115
THE MONTH IN REVIEW . . . . .		117

# Current History

Founded in 1914 by  
The New York Times

Editor, 1943-1955:  
D. G. REDMOND

---

FEBRUARY, 1959

Volume 36                      Number 210

---

**Publisher:**  
**DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.**

**Editor:**  
**CAROL L. THOMPSON**

**Assistant Editor:**  
**JOAN L. BARKON**

**Promotion Consultant:**  
**MARY A. MEEHAN**

•  
**Contributing Editors**

**ROSS N. BERKES**  
*University of Southern California*

**ALZADA COMSTOCK**  
*Mt. Holyoke College*

**PHILIP D. CURTIN**  
*University of Wisconsin*

**DAVID DENKER**  
*Rutgers University*

**SIDNEY B. FAY**  
*Harvard University*

**MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY**  
*Columbia University*

**NORMAN A. GRAEBNER**  
*University of Illinois*

**STEPHEN D. KERTESZ**  
*University of Notre Dame*

**HANS KOHN**  
*City College of New York*

**DONALD W. MITCHELL**  
*Military Historian*

**NORMAN D. PALMER**  
*University of Pennsylvania*

**JOHN P. ROCHE**  
*Brandeis University*

**A. L. ROWSE**  
*All Souls College, Oxford*

**HARRY R. RUDIN**  
*Yale University*

**FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN**  
*Williams College*

**RICHARD VAN ALSTYNE**  
*University of Southern California*

**COLSTON E. WARNE**  
*Amherst College*

---

65 cents a copy: 7 dollars a year. Canada 7 dollars twenty-five cents a year. Foreign including the Philippines 7 dollars fifty cents a year.

## Coming next month . . .

### INDIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

March, 1959

Our March issue examines Indian foreign policy and its implications in a very troubled world. Our contributors include:

Ross N. Berkes, Director of the School of International Relations, University of Southern California, who is writing on **INDIA AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD**;

M. V. Kamath, Special Correspondent, Press Trust of India, Ltd., discussing **INDIA'S ROLE IN THE UNITED NATIONS**;

K. M. Panikkar, Indian Ambassador to France, and author of *Federal India* and *The New Empire*, analyzing **POLITICS IN INDIA**;

Norman D. Palmer, Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, writing on **INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES**;

P. Kodanda Rao, Servants of India Society, Bangalore, discussing **INDIA AND PAKISTAN**;

George Kuriyan, Professor of Geography, University of Madras, India, and author of *Hydro-Electric Power in India: A Geographical Analysis*, evaluating **INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS IN INDIA**;

J. J. Anjaria, Economic Advisor, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, focusing on **AGRI-CULTURAL PROGRESS IN INDIA**.

#### TENSIONS IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE!

Coming, April, 1959

---

Published monthly by Events Publishing Co., Inc. Publication Office, 108-10 Walnut St., Philadelphia 6, Pa. Editorial Office, Wolfpit Rd., Norwalk, Conn. Entered as second class matter May 12, 1943, at the post office at Philadelphia, Pa., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright, 1959, by Events Publishing Company, Inc.

# Current History

Vol. 36

FEBRUARY, 1959

No. 210

*In the Middle East, American statesmen must evaluate the rising tide of Arab nationalism, the effect of anti-Western hostility and the influence of the Soviet Union. In this issue eight articles examine the forces at work in the area. Of primary importance is Egypt because, as this first article points out, it is probable that the Arab states will "coalesce around Egyptian leadership." What will this mean for the United States?*

## The United Arab Republic

By CHARLES ISSAWI

*Assistant Professor of Near and Middle East Economics, Columbia University*

THE proclamation of the merger of Egypt and Syria to form the United Arab Republic, in February, 1958, came as a great surprise to all observers of Middle Eastern developments. Indeed there is some evidence that even the diplomats of these two countries were caught completely unawares. It is true that, since the inception of the Arab League in 1944, collaboration between Egypt and Syria has been particularly close, especially as against the Hashimite axis of Iraq and Jordan; this collaboration took a dramatic and concrete form during the Suez crisis, when the Syrians blew up the pipelines transporting Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean. It is also true that, in 1955, the Egyptian, Syrian and Saudi Arabian armies had been placed under a unified command. Furthermore, on September 3, 1957, an agreement was signed providing for economic union between the two countries. All these were pointers in the direction of unity and several observers did expect some form of federal union eventually to take place. But few expected it so soon, and there is good reason to believe that the fateful step was taken on the spur of the moment, and without much deliberation, in January, 1958.

In inquiring what motives prompted this decision it is best to begin with Syria since the initial proposal seems to have come from there. The most plausible general explana-

tion is that the Syrian army leaders and politicians who approached Abdel Nasser came to see in unity with Egypt the only way out of the dangerous stalemate in which the country found itself. The politicians were, and had been for many years, hopelessly divided and incapable of mustering agreement on any major policy. More serious still the army, which since 1949 was the effective ruler of Syria, had split up into rival factions of roughly equal strength. In the meantime, the influence of the Communists and their powerful fellow-travelers was growing rapidly and was beginning to affect policy.

Then came the August, 1957, Turko-Syrian crisis which awakened memories of a similar critical situation in 1955 and, as seen from Syria, seemed to constitute a mortal threat.<sup>1</sup> In these circumstances it was felt that literally anything could happen and that the best hope for stability and security lay in putting the country under the protection of its bigger and stronger Arab brother, Egypt.

But longer-term forces were also at play. It should not be forgotten that Syria (using the term in its wider sense) was the birthplace of Arab nationalism and that, because of its checkered history since the end of the

<sup>1</sup> For a brief but penetrating account of the 1957 crisis see Richard H. Nolte and William R. Polk, "Toward a Policy for the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1958.

First World War, Syria has always responded more readily than any other part of the Arab world to the call for unification. Nor is it accidental that Syria was the first country to proclaim in its constitution that it was part of the Arab nation, a step followed by Egypt six years later. A small and poor country, wedged between Israel and Turkey, it naturally looked for outside help.

The obvious partner would have been Iraq, and at one time or other at least a large minority of Syrians desired federation with that country. However, the fact that Iraq was a monarchy, and still more that it was under British influence, repelled many others and the lack of eagerness and initiative on the part of the Iraqis to consummate the union frustrated such hopes.

Another possibility was Saudi Arabia—which indeed gave Syria considerable financial help—but its backwardness made it an undesirable and ineffective partner. As for Jordan, it was generally regarded as more of a liability than an asset.

Egypt, on the other hand, seemed to meet Syria's needs much more adequately. To its traditional appeal as an Arab and Muslim leader was added the new appeal of a revolutionary country that had carried out the political and social changes advocated by middle class Syrian intellectuals, especially those gathered around the powerful Baath party. Moreover, Egypt's rising international prestige, and its growing military potential following the acquisition of Czech and Soviet arms, enhanced still further its attraction, as did the personality of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Observers unanimously agree that the enthusiasm with which he was greeted in Damascus, during his visit shortly after the proclamation of the union, was unparalleled in recent history. Since then, that enthusiasm has abated, for reasons which will be discussed later.

### Egypt's Goals

The road that led Egypt to the U.A.R. was different. For many years Egypt had been looked upon as the natural leader by many Arabs, but such sentiments had found little response in Egypt itself. Throughout its long history, Egypt had always had a very sharply defined individuality and one which clearly

marked it off from its neighbors. This was partly due to ethnic factors, partly to the fact that it is surrounded by vast deserts and partly to its peculiar social structure, so different from that of other Middle Eastern lands; for whereas the other Arab countries are, or at least were until very recently, markedly nomadic, Egypt is one of the most sedentary countries in the world. It is surely significant that the Book of Genesis states that "every shepherd is an abomination unto the Egyptians" (xlii. 34)! To these secular factors may be added a more recent one: during the formative period of Arab nationalism Egypt was preoccupied with its struggle against the British and had no time or interest to spare for its neighbors.

Things began to change in the 1930's. The Palestinian Arab revolt of 1936 evoked much sympathy in Egypt and received a small amount of aid from the recently founded Muslim Brotherhood. In 1939, Egypt participated with other Arab countries in the London Round Table Conference on Palestine. And in 1944 it took the lead in creating the Arab League, in which it has always played the main part. In the postwar period, the dynastic ambitions of King Farouk constituted a further force pushing Egypt towards greater involvement in Arab affairs. Then came the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-1949, the first the Egyptian army had fought since the reconquest of the Sudan in 1898. This was followed shortly by the revolution of 1952, whose leaders were veterans of the Palestinian campaign, and for the first time in its history Egypt was governed by men who had had direct experience of other Arab countries and who realized that Egypt was now involved in Arab affairs and that what happened to its neighbors was bound to affect it closely.

Egypt's present ambitions have been clearly stated by President Abdel Nasser in his well-known theory of the Three Circles. According to him Egypt participates, and should play a leading role, in three groups: the Arab, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf; the African, where it can be the champion of anti-colonialism; and the vast Muslim world. A study of Egyptian history lends much support to this view. From the earliest times Egypt has felt a *Drang nach Osten*, an urge to expand in



South-West Asia, partly in order to control the incense and, later, the spice routes.<sup>2</sup> The most recent manifestation of this millennial trend was Mohammad Ali's attempt, 1811-1840, to found an empire stretching to the Tigris and including much of Arabia, an attempt that might well have succeeded but for the opposition of the Great Powers.

As for Africa, it should not be forgotten that in the middle of the nineteenth century, under Mohammad Ali and Ismail, Egyptian rule extended to the Great Lakes and Somaliland but it should not be forgotten, either, that at that time Egypt's role was anything but anticolonialist! Finally, as regards Islam, Egypt has been one of the two or three leading Muslim centers ever since the foundation of Al Azhar university in the tenth century and its influence has increased as that of its rivals declined. In the last third of the nineteenth century, Egypt was strongly influenced by the Pan-Islamic theories of Jamal al Din al Afghani and many Egyptians looked to a revitalized Ottoman Empire to achieve Muslim unity. The rejections of political Islam by Turkey, and the rise of secular Egyptian, Arab and Iranian nationalism, have greatly weakened Pan-Islamism but it is still not without appeal in places like Pakistan, Indonesia and Africa, and Islam continues to form a strong strand in Arab nationalism.

Such are the perspectives before Egypt's rulers. Perhaps subconsciously influenced by them, Egyptian attitudes towards other Arabs have recently begun to change. For millenia Egypt was regarded by the inhabitants of the other Arab countries as a land of milk and honey upon which they descended just as the Scots descended upon England. Egyptians remember a long list of such impecunious visitors—from Joseph under the Pharaohs to the Syrians and Lebanese under Ismail and the British—who rose to affluence and power. But now things are changing; it is Egyptians who go in thousands to other Arab countries, as teachers, technicians or propagandists, earning incomes they could never hope for at home. And, much more important, it is Egypt which is now looking towards other countries to help it with its very acute economic problems.

### Economics in Egypt

These problems are very easy to state and very difficult to solve. Briefly, after a slow rise in per capita incomes for nearly a century, Egypt has been waging a losing battle since the First World War to maintain its low standard of living. The expansion of its cultivated area, which has been made possible by large-scale irrigation works, has greatly slowed down as reserves of readily available land have been exhausted. Its cotton exports, the mainstay of its economy, have suffered from the general fall in the price of agricultural raw materials. And in the meantime its population growth has been accelerating and now stands well above two per cent per annum. With over 24 million inhabitants cooped in 6 million acres of cultivated land, Egypt is one of the most overpopulated countries in the world.

Under the monarchy, successive governments let matters drift and the situation deteriorated.<sup>3</sup> The new regime has made several bold moves in the economic field. The land reform of 1952, which expropriated all land from estates of over 200 or 300 acres, will transfer some 600,000 acres to about 200,000 landless families. This palliative was to be accompanied by a more drastic remedy, the expansion of the cultivated area by some 1,300,000 acres through the building of the High Dam above Aswan. It would seem that implementation of this scheme, which was postponed in 1956 in circumstances that are well known, will soon begin with the help of a Soviet loan of 100 million rubles.

In the meantime attempts have been made to accelerate industrial growth. Industrialization assumed significant proportions in Egypt only after 1930 and as recently as 1953 manufacturing and mining accounted for only nine per cent of the gross national product; it might be added that all industrial development up to that time was carried out by private enterprise. In the last few years, however, the rate of growth has risen sharply, the index of industrial production (1954 = 100) climbing from 92 in

<sup>2</sup> See Charles Issawi, *Egypt at Mid-Century* (London, 1954), pp. 10-12 and *ibid.*, "Crusades and Current Crises in the Near East," *International Affairs*, July 1957 (London).

<sup>3</sup> See Charles Issawi, *Egypt at Mid-Century*, chapter five.

1951 to 124 in the second quarter of 1957.<sup>4</sup> At the same time, the government has come to play a dominant role in industry, as in some other branches of the economy; this is vividly indicated by the fact that government agencies accounted for 75 per cent of new capital issues in 1957 and for 66 per cent of issues of industrial companies.<sup>5</sup> Both these trends will be accentuated by the agreement for Economic and Technical Cooperation with the Soviet Union, signed January, 1958, by which Egypt will receive credits of 700 million rubles for industrial projects.

Another important economic event was the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in July, 1956. To the surprise of Western observers, who as usual both exaggerated the technical difficulties of running any enterprise and greatly underestimated the resourcefulness of local talent, the Canal has been working at a higher rate of traffic than under its former management; the daily rate in January-May, 1958, was 48 ships, against 45 during January-June, 1956. At present, Egypt is receiving over £E40 million a year (about \$100 million) in tolls, a figure which should leave a substantial surplus after all expenses have been met; these run about £E28 million a year, including the payment of £E4 million a year until 1964 as compensation to former owners under the agreement signed in April, 1958. Contracts for widening and deepening the Canal were awarded to three American companies in July, 1958.<sup>6</sup>

### Rising National Income

Thanks to these developments, and to a small increase in agricultural production, the national income has been rising; according to official estimates, which may somewhat overstate the increase, total domestic product at 1953 prices rose from £E799 million in 1952 to £E1,043 million in 1955, falling to £E956 million in 1956 because of the Suez crisis and war.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, Egypt's economic difficulties remain very acute, and an increasing number of Egyptians are looking to other Arab countries for help in solving them; their hopes are centered on finding outlets for surplus population and markets for manufactured goods and on sharing the

vast oil resources accruing to other Arab countries.

### Syria's Problems

Now Syria alone cannot bring much aid, and this in spite of the fact that its own basic problems are much simpler and that its recent progress has been remarkable. It is true that, thanks to the rapid extension of cultivation on marginal lands, the spectacular growth of cotton production, a substantial rise in industrial output and, more recently, an appreciable rise in royalties received for the transit of petroleum through the pipelines, Syria's gross national product has probably more than doubled in the post war period; between 1950 and 1956 the average rate of increase has been of the order of eight per cent per annum.<sup>8</sup> Today output per head in both agriculture and industry is significantly higher than in Egypt and per capita annual income is probably well over \$150, compared with about \$100 for Egypt. Nevertheless, in view of the small size of Syria's population—about four million—and area the contribution it can make to Egypt's economy is very limited.

These limitations are reinforced by the divergence between the economic systems prevailing in the two countries. For whereas in Egypt government control has always been great, and is now increasing rapidly, Syria's economy is based on private enterprise. This partly explains the fact that, so far, no attempt has been made to merge the two economies. A statement that this would be done soon was, however, made by Abdel Nasser last summer and already three important steps have been taken: the dissolution of Syrian political parties, the merging of the two cabinets into one and the enactment of an agrarian reform law in Syria modelled on that of Egypt but somewhat more drastic. In addition, the Syrian civil service and army are coming under increasing Egyptian control.

<sup>4</sup> National Bank of Egypt, *Economic Bulletin*, vol. XI, no. 1 (Cairo, 1958).

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. XI, no. 2.

<sup>6</sup> For fuller details on the operation of the Canal see "Safe Passage: A Round up of Suez since Nationalization," *Arab World*, September 1958 (New York).

<sup>7</sup> United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Economic Development in the Middle East, 1956-7*, page 7, (New York, 1958).

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83.

These measures, which have directly affected many influential Syrians, can only increase the second thoughts and misgivings regarding union which began to appear in Syria last summer. Such misgivings have been accentuated by the outbreak of the Iraqi revolution, which removed the main Syrian objections to union with that country; indeed many Syrians expressed their regret that that revolution had not taken place earlier, since they could then have joined Iraq rather than Egypt. However, more recent events in Iraq and the growing communist power in that country have once more diminished its attractiveness and correspondingly increased that of Egypt. It is most unlikely that the union with Egypt will now be broken, if only because there is left no organized group, civilian or military, which is in a position to take the lead in such a move.

It seems probable, then, that the U.A.R. has come to stay but neither it, nor the looser United Arab States, which includes Egypt, Syria and Yemen, is likely to retain its present form for very long. For neither provides a real solution for Egypt's economic problems or offers much scope for Syria. Both interest and sentiments impel the U.A.R. towards the oil countries of the Persian Gulf and the Sudan while its sentiments turn it towards North Africa as well.

Nor are these interests and sentiments one-sided. At least in the eastern Arab countries, Abdel Nasser has great popular appeal and Egyptian leadership is welcomed by large sections of the town dwellers, who alone count politically. And although union with Egypt may entail some serious economic disadvantages for certain Arab countries, these are in most cases offset by minor economic advantages as well as major social and political gains. One may therefore expect, in the

not too distant future, to see other countries joined to Egypt and Syria. This does not necessarily mean that they will merge with the U.A.R., since some at least may prefer the looser confederate form provided for by the United Arab States. But it does mean coalescence around Egyptian leadership.

Such a prospect naturally involves clashes of interest within the Arab world. More serious will be the clashes of interest with other countries: with Britain in the Persian Gulf, with France in Algeria, with Israel and, in so far as it is tied up with some or all of these states, as also because of some of its own interests, with the United States. By the same token, Soviet support for the U.A.R. may be expected to continue, and even to increase, since the Soviets are bound to try to exploit any conflict involving the West. Arab nationalism, a powerful and growing force, is aiming at unifying the area around the U.A.R. So far, the West has failed to frame an adequate policy towards it, and the task of doing so will demand statesmanship of a very high order both in the United States and in other Western countries.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> This matter is discussed in an article by the present writer "Negotiation from Strength? A Reappraisal of Western-Arab Relations" in *International Affairs*, January, 1959 (London).

Charles Issawi was born in Cairo, Egypt, and educated at Oxford University, England. He served in the Ministry of Finance and the National Bank of Egypt in Cairo from 1937 to 1943, and with the Middle Eastern division of the United Nations Department of Economic Affairs from 1948 to 1955. Author of *Egypt at Mid-Century*, Mr. Issawi has also taught at the American University in Beirut.

"The argument that the United States cannot compete against cheap foreign labor is disproved, in part, by the plain fact that our high-wage industries do compete in foreign markets, and very successfully too. In addition, domestic production has displaced imports in the home market in the face of lower tariffs. This was possible because of high productivity, which means high wages and low unit costs. Our great mass production industries no longer need protection. Indeed, they would profit under free trade."

—From the *Twentieth Century Fund* survey, "American Imports," by Don D. Humphrey.

*This specialist outlines "some of the frightening problems and fruitful prospects confronting Israel as she gropes her way to survival, handicapped by a badly distorted economy, surrounded by hostile neighbors and living in a world where allies are both few and undependable."*

## Israeli Policy for Survival

By DWIGHT J. SIMPSON

*Assistant Professor of Political Science, Williams College*

THE sensational political explosions during the summer of 1958 in Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan rocked the Middle East to its foundations. Once recovered from the initial shock, Western statesmen, always fearful of Round III of the Palestine War and the possibility of its sparking a general conflagration, looked anxiously to Jerusalem to see what position Israel would take in light of the new developments. In October, when the fogs of obscurity had lifted sufficiently for observers to distinguish the new political forms and to appraise their possible consequences, the Opposition parties in Israel's Parliament submitted to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion an urgent request for a full dress Knesset debate on Israel's foreign policy. Ben-Gurion's answer was a flat rejection of the request accompanied by a declaration that, insofar as Israel's foreign policy was concerned, the admittedly serious events in neighboring Arab countries had given no cause for any policy re-assessment or reformulation.

This bluntness, which to a remote observer might have suggested excessive *sang froid*, was in fact a very predictable attitude for Ben-Gurion. Indeed, his reply to the Knesset Opposition was only an accurate reflection of the two major premises upon which Israeli

foreign policy has rested for several years past.

The first premise has to do with political conditions inside Israel itself: Israel's present foreign policy, which might be described as "armed alert," can be expected to command overwhelming majority support from all levels and classes of Israeli society whose members, moreover, have repeatedly shown an enthusiastic willingness to endure the hardships and pay the costs of this policy.

There is, of course, some dissent from the majority position especially on specific issues such as the crucial matters of refugees, boundaries, peace treaties with the Arab states and other legacies of the Palestine War. This dissent is embodied in the three principal Israeli Opposition parties, Communist, Achdut Ha'avoda and Mapam, which among them claim the support of approximately 15 per cent of the electorate. Taken as a whole the Israeli parliamentary Opposition is a rather curious amalgam of pro-Soviet, anti-Zionist, pro-Arabist and revolutionary socialist viewpoints.

As foreign policy alternatives the Opposition speaks, somewhat vaguely and with little or no political effectiveness, about "neutralism," "non-alignment" and "integration of Israel into the region of the Middle East." The Opposition principle of "integration" is one which finds general theoretical acceptance in Israel but thus far no one, and particularly the Opposition Parties themselves, has been able to provide a precise definition of what this means, not to mention a feasible and acceptable rationale for its accomplishment. Beyond this there are abundant reasons why the Opposition can have little hope of successfully attacking the Government's conduct of

Dwight J. Simpson, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, is a graduate of Oxford University who has had long experience in the Middle East. During 1957-1958 he was attached to the Faculty of Law, University of Istanbul. He is a regular contributor to various professional journals.



foreign policy. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that, since the great majority of Israeli public opinion is so national security conscious, any specific foreign policy decision which is designated as essential to the nation's defense will command massive support among the population.

The second premise of Israel's foreign policy results from a coldly realistic appraisal of the probable future course of events in the uniformly hostile Arab world that surrounds her. Israeli leaders anticipate continuing instability in Arab world politics and make no effort to conceal their belief that Arab hostility, and thus potential danger to Israel, is greater than ever before.

In this respect Israeli foreign policy has come full circle. Following the conclusion of the 1949 Armistice agreements many Israeli politicians of all parties made the easy assumption that formal peace treaties would soon result and consequently the Middle East, and Israel's position in it, would be stabilized. The assumption was possible for two reasons: first, because of the widely held view that the feudal ruling cliques in neighboring Arab states, with a vested interest in the *status quo*, had deliberately fostered Arab resentment of Israel, a resentment which Israelis believed was not widespread in Arab society as a whole. Arab governments, so the reasoning went, diligently nurtured hatred of Israel in order to divert mass resentment of widespread social injustice from themselves. All that was needed, then, was for the regimes to change. New Arab regimes, bent on correcting Arab social and economic ailments, would see the advantages of early peace with modern, progressive Israel.

Secondly, since the three Western Great Powers had undertaken to guarantee existing borders as of 1950 it seemed abundantly clear to the Jews that the Arabs would in any case soon be forced to come to an agreed settlement.

Subsequent events demonstrated that neither assumption was justified. As new Arab regimes arose in country after country it became evident that the young officer class of Arab politician, personified by Gamal Abdel Nasser, was even more intractable than its pasha predecessors. Although keenly

interested in such "forward-looking" concepts as land reform, industrialization and technological modernization, the new Arab leadership was at the same time, and contrary to expectations, bitterly anti-Israel.

After September of 1955, when Nasser concluded his sensational munitions agreement with the Soviet bloc, the last basis for Israeli optimism about an Arab-Jewish reconciliation was finally removed. And in the then existing context a second round of the Palestine War seemed inevitable, particularly since Great Britain, France and the United States obviously were unwilling or unable to honor their commitment to stabilize the area's borders.

Thus Israeli foreign policy, realistically taking cognizance of the changed Middle East since the end of the campaign in the Sinai Desert, is presently predicated on the two constants: overwhelming public support of the policy itself and the likelihood of continuing Arab political instability and Arab hostility to Israel. This fact makes the task of Israeli statesmen considerably easier: within this context there is little else to do except to "sit tight" and to "keep the powder dry."

### Economic Difficulties

Outside this context however are several variables which could undermine not only Israeli foreign policy of "armed alert" but the national welfare of the country. First, there is the increasingly grave problem of Israel's economy which, in the surprised view of most professional economists including many in the Israeli Government, continues to function in spite of having violated every known economic "law." But as Professor Marver H. Bernstein of Princeton University wrote in his distinguished recent volume, *The Politics of Israel: the First Decade of Statehood*: "Israel's problems of economic development have been aptly termed an economist's nightmare."

In this respect the Bank of Israel report for 1955 soberly noted that economic survival depended upon speedy government enactment of a program which would achieve five goals, including stemming the ever-rising inflationary tide, stabilizing the currency, reducing costs of production in local indus-

tries, sharply increasing industrial and agricultural productivity and expanding exports. And, although it was outside their frame of reference, the Bank's Directors might well have noted that what the economy needed most of all was some kind of respite from the continued pressure of the Middle Eastern arms race. The Bank Report concluded:

... the year 1955 witnessed only a very slow advance towards the solution of the basic problems facing the Israel economy. The proportion of earners in the commodity producing branches, and especially in the branches producing export and import substitutes, increased slightly but remained low. Local production continued to be largely dependent on imports, despite the fact that real progress was made in some directions, notably in industrial crops, toward substituting local raw materials for imports. The heavy burden of public expenditure continued to absorb a large share of the labour force and of available materials. The tendency for production costs to rise may become still more pronounced, as wages paid to the majority of earners, as well as other production costs, increase; and this may, in turn, adversely affect the volume of employment.<sup>1</sup>

Since this basically gloomy, and authoritative, report was issued the dangerous economic trends it described have become more pronounced. An increasing amount of Israel's capital, manpower and resources is being used to produce high-cost goods. Most of these, because of rising living standards and increased consumer expectations and appetites, are being consumed locally. Thus the projected growth of export trade is lagging. Moreover price rises, increased labor costs and general inflation are no longer haunting spectres but economic realities.

But if a stringent policy of austerity would seem to be in order economically it is clear that it would be out of the question politically. The present Israeli Government appears to reason, with ample justification, that there is an amount of sacrifice that cannot be expected of even the most idealistic citizen. The Israeli general public which works hard, pays very heavy taxes, lives in a garrison state of semi-mobilization, faces the bewildering social problems of "integration" with fellow co-religionist immigrants from 40 different countries and bears the psychological pressures of the constant threat

of war must have some reward in order to make life endurable. The only feasible reward is an increased consumption of goods and services within the context of a rising standard of living. And it should be remembered that this standard, although the highest in the Middle East, is well below that of Europe and far below that of the United States.

### Public Works

To add to the Government's economic problems is the question of "public expenditures" noted in the Bank of Israel Report. Major development projects such as roads, ports, dams and power stations require the importation of a very heavy volume of capital equipment and, unfortunately for Israel, at a time when the world price level of such materials is rising sharply. Thus five miles of road which cost 100 units of expenditure in 1950 would probably cost from 150 to 200 units in 1959. But Israel's foreign exchange earnings, both from foreign loans and gifts and from her export trade, have remained remarkably steady during these same years. Therefore she must either curtail internal public expenditures (again politically impossible) or earn substantially more abroad (very unlikely).

### Military Costs

Much the same could be said about public expenditures for military equipment. A well-equipped defense force capable of meeting any threat to national security is the foundation upon which everything else in Israel must rest. As modern warfare becomes more and more a competition between technologies it follows that the nation possessing the most advanced weapons will have the greatest initial advantage in any conflict. Consequently as the military forces of the United Arab Republic continue to receive large quantities of the most modern equipment produced by the Soviet bloc the Israelis must somehow acquire as good or better equipment from the West. A new shipment of MIG 17's or Ilyushins to Cairo thus obligates Jerusalem to seek an equivalent number of Sabres or Mystères.

The economic cost to Israel is punishing

<sup>1</sup> Bank of Israel, *Annual Report 1955* (Jerusalem: The Government Printer, 1956, English version), pp. 1920.

because, like capital development equipment, military equipment also annually increases in price. Moreover, there is the problem of rapid obsolescence: a new type Russian anti-aircraft rocket in the hands of the Arabs might effectively ground much of the Israeli air force. Finally, since the Soviet bloc is giving or selling cheaply such huge amounts of modern military equipment to the Arabs, the Israelis who have no comparable benefactor in the West are at an almost insuperable economic disadvantage.

One further point needs mentioning: Israel still is committed to receiving as immigrants as many Jews in the world who wish to come. This is understandable since the *raison d'être* of Zionism, of which the State of Israel is the outcome, is the "Ingathering of the Exiles." To close the door to prospective immigrants would mean to negate this cardinal principle as well as to contribute to the misery and suffering of Jews now oppressed in several foreign countries. In this respect the great question mark is the 3 million Jews in the Soviet Union from which immigration to Israel is now prohibited by Soviet authorities.

On the other hand Israeli statesmen and world Jewish leaders rightfully assume that a very large percentage of their "captive" brethren would come to Israel if circumstances permitted. What, then, would Israeli authorities do if Soviet authorities were suddenly to allow unrestricted Jewish exit from the Soviet Union? Fearful that the golden opportunity might never come again, Israel would be forced to make a maximum effort to receive a gigantic new wave of immigration, one which might well engulf the already struggling, faltering economy.

If there is a direct relationship between a strong economy and an effective foreign policy then Israel has much to worry about. However, of the three crucial problems mentioned here there is not much that the Government can or will do. To enforce a rigorous economic austerity program would not be politically possible and understandably so since Israel is after all not the only political democracy in the world whose rulers pay more attention to the elections than to

the lamentations of economists. As for matching Arab armaments, Israel has no choice whatever. In the absence of an enforceable peace settlement national survival depends upon "keeping up" in the arms race. Finally if immigration from Russia—which the Government both hopes for and dreads—becomes possible, utter economic chaos might ensue. If there are no apparent remedies for these problems then the truth of the comment on Israel made by Mr. Alex Rubner, former Adviser to the Israel Ministry of Finance, is obvious:

Israel's leaders will point out to their critics that they have survived by not paying attention in the past to pessimists. "Something is bound to turn up" sums up the attitude that inspires the architects of Israel's economy. It may shock social scientists, but it is a determinate factor to be taken into account when one suggests economically practical solutions.<sup>2</sup>

That something good may indeed "turn up" for Israel is one of the themes of a recent valuable book by a distinguished French journalist, M. Paul Giniewski. In his volume, *Israël devant L'Afrique et L'Asie*, M. Giniewski described his view that, since any attempts to resolve the Arab-Jewish quarrel is likely to end in stalemate and since it is not in the interests of the Great Powers to permit another outbreak of the Palestine War, then the most Israel can hope for is a prolonged period of no war-no peace.

Israel should use profitably this time gained and the most promising way, according to M. Giniewski, would be through an intensive exploitation of her three great natural assets: her geographic location on the principal trade routes to all the underdeveloped countries of Africa and Asia; the largest pool of skilled manpower in the Middle East; and the southern half of her territory, the Negev.

Forty per cent of Israel's population is of European origin and of this a very high proportion possesses highly skilled technical training and scientific knowledge. Because of this fact, the Israelis have an opportunity to demonstrate that there can be two sides to the technical assistance coin. Consequently Israel, long a "receiver" of foreign technical

<sup>2</sup> Alex Rubner, "Problems of Israel's Economy: Much Still to be Resolved," *Commentary*, September, 1958, p. 219.

aid, is now beginning to function as a "giver" to countries such as Ghana, Ceylon, India and others. Working in close cooperation with the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, the Israeli Government has contributed generously both money and personnel to a special assistance fund which is used in part to pay the salaries of Israeli experts who are sent to help other countries and in part to pay for foreign fellowship holders studying and training at Israeli universities, research institutes, laboratories and industrial plants.

### Aid from Israel

Recent examples of the considerable Israeli technical assistance program at work are the teams of technicians and scientists who have served throughout the so-called underdeveloped world. Last year a team of chemical technicians was assigned to Ceylon to reorganize the Ceylonese salt extraction and refinery operations. As a direct result of the Israeli contribution Ceylon no longer has to import salt and is now looking toward the possibility of becoming an exporting country. Dr. Amihud Goor, one of the world's outstanding afforestation experts who directed much of the tree planting in Israel, is currently heading a large team of experts and teachers to perform an important afforestation mission in India.

In addition to extending valuable technical aid to Asian and African countries, Israel has at the same time sedulously fostered increased Israeli-Afro-Asian trade. There is a virtually untapped Asian consumers' market for the kind of manufactures Israel could supply, whereas Asian raw materials of all kinds would be welcome to Israeli industry which otherwise has to purchase them, for hard currencies, in the West. Moreover, there is the important long-range prospect that extensive trade with India and the lands to the East would enable Israel to approach a viable economy. In the opinion of some observers, such trade is the real hope of finally closing the yawning gap between Israel's relatively small exports and her vast imports.<sup>3</sup>

Any strengthening of technical assistance and commercial ties between Israel and Asia is almost certain to improve political rela-

tions also. This is of the greatest importance since most Asian governments have tended to regard Zionism as a product of Western imperialism and not as a part of the general Asian liberation movement, whereas the Asian view of the Arab nationalist movement, with its anti-Western overtones, has been far more favorable. Moreover, because of present political circumstances Israel, to the distaste of most Asian countries, has had to maintain close relations with certain Western states particularly France, the possessor of a colored colonial Empire, and the United States, a major adversary in the Cold War.

Consequently Israel has been granted diplomatic recognition in Asia only by Japan, Burma, Laos and Thailand. Since, in the words of the Israeli Foreign Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir, "Israel holds out a friendly hand to the Afro-Asian nations, and desires to establish reciprocal relations with them"<sup>4</sup> it is obvious that Israel hopes to overcome this Asian diplomatic isolation and to strengthen her international position through expanded mutual contacts.

### The Negev


Prior to the establishment of Israel, a great deal of romantic nonsense was written about "making the desert bloom," the "desert" being the Negev, the 4000 square mile semi-arid triangle comprising one-half of Israel's territory. Although it is still possible to be cautiously optimistic on this score, ten years of experience have shown that the desert will not bloom quickly nor before tremendous amounts of capital, manpower and scientific skills are expended.

Rich mineral resources are known to be there: oil has been discovered at Heletz, the Dead Sea is one of the greatest repositories of bromides for the production of potash, copper deposits of more than 150,000 metallic tons have been discovered near the site of the ancient mines of King Solomon, and there are significant deposits of manganese, iron ore and phosphates. The new Red Sea port of Eilat is growing rapidly and is

<sup>3</sup> For a recent survey of Israeli trade efforts in this direction, see "Israel Looks toward Africa and Asia," *The World Today*, January, 1958, pp. 37-46.

<sup>4</sup> *Israel Weekly Survey* (Jerusalem: The Government Printer, April 18, 1957), I, 1026.





Department of State

## THE MIDDLE EAST

beginning to function as the entrepôt for an already increased trade with Asia and Africa. An oil pipeline is in operation between Eilat and Ashkelon on the Mediterranean coast while the Yarkon-Negev water pipeline has already improved agricultural prospects in the northern Negev.

But the most promising prospect concerning the Negev today is that, through the major work of two Israeli scientists, a nearly perfected technique for producing both cheap water and cheap power is at hand. At the UNESCO-assisted Negev Institute for Arab Zone Research, pioneer work has been done on de-salinating the Negev's substantial reserves of saline well water. The most revolutionary project is that of Alexander Zarchin, a Russian-born scientist who has successfully tested his pilot plant for de-salting sea water. From the preliminary report Zarchin submitted to the Israeli Government two facts emerge: the machine works and the process is apparently cheap

enough to make wide agricultural and industrial expansion in the Negev economically feasible. As important as cheap water is cheap power. The Israelis are now leading the world in research on harnessing solar energy. Harry Tabor, a London-born physicist, has constructed a pilot solar turbine which has solved the major puzzle of solar heat collection: heat loss through radiation.

These are some of the frightening problems and fruitful prospects confronting Israel as she gropes her way to survival, handicapped by a badly distorted economy, surrounded by hostile neighbors and living in a world where allies are both few and undependable. Whether Israel will celebrate an anniversary marking a second decade of statehood will depend, in any final reckoning, upon her continued resourcefulness, resolution and basic idealism. In this respect if recent past history is a reliable guide to the future then Israel's chances for survival are good.

---

"By science we mean most particularly an intellectual method and the organized and integrated description of phenomena which results from it. Its transcendence in the life of our generation has come from its fruitful union with technology—by which we mean the aggregate of the materials, devices and techniques which our ingenuity and industry have brought into existence. Science and technology have long and interesting separate histories during the courses of which science was impractical and technology unimaginative. To the scientist of today, possibly the most salient observation of history prior to our own Revolution is the lack of any evidence of an effective and fruitful inter-connection between science and technology. Coincidentally with the Industrial Revolution, scientists and technologists have joined hands and minds and brought about such a fruitful union between their fields of interest that the conditions of our society have altered more rapidly and profoundly than in any previous generation, and this cannot be without a most striking effect upon our education. Other ages have been known as the ages of Stone or Bronze or Iron or Faith or Enlightenment. Ours is certainly the Age of Science, for it is the principal characteristic of our culture in distinguishing it from the cultures of the past. Children play with rocket toys and encase their little heads in plastic bubbles with metal antenna for reaching out into the vast space which their imagination peoples with the wonders of their universe. Men devise and employ means of communication and transportation undreamed of by their fathers. Electronic computation, automatic industrial control, and the mitigation of toil by the devices for lightening common chores are part of an accepted pattern from which there is no turning back."

—Dr. Gaylord P. Harnwell, *President of the University of Pennsylvania, The Teacher Is the Most Essential Person in Any Society, October 20, 1958.*

*Discussing Jordanian nationalism, this author describes "the pull exerted by the rising star of Nasser, especially on those elements of the Jordanian population who are dissatisfied with their living conditions," and the "emerging feelings of Jordanian nationalism" that counteract Nasser's appeal.*

# Nationalism in Jordan

By RAPHAEL PATAI

*Director of Research, Theodor Herzl Institute*

ON November 10, 1958, the private plane of King Hussein of Jordan was attacked by two MIG jet fighters of the United Arab Republic over Syrian territory and forced to fly back into Jordan. Shortly after landing at Amman, from where he had set out only two hours earlier for Switzerland, the young King reported the events to his nation in a broadcast over the Jordanian radio. The news of the Syrian attack on the King and his successful escape provoked enthusiastic demonstrations of loyalty by the army and elements of the Jordanian population. There could be little doubt that the incident increased the popularity of King Hussein and strengthened his position on the all important home-front. The event itself, and the resultant reaction of the population are typical instances of what nationality has come to mean in Jordan and in the Arab states in general.

The establishment by the victorious allies of the Emirate of Transjordan as a separate

principality soon after the conclusion of World War I was based on purely extraneous considerations. The territory designated as the Emirate was not at the time, nor had it been in past history, a separate national or territorial unit. The prince selected by the British to be Emir of Transjordan was not a native of the country; he was Abdullah, a son of the ousted ruler of Hejaz, the Sherif Hussein. The boundaries of the area were arbitrarily drawn across the expanses of the North Arabian and Syrian deserts. The population consisted of an estimated 300,000 persons, largely illiterate, mostly nomadic or semi-nomadic, with interests strictly confined to tribe or village.

In order to introduce even the most rudimentary semblance of a government, the new principality had to be subsidized and a small armed force had to be organized by the British. No sooner was the new Emirate created and placed under British mandatory rule by the League of Nations (this latter event took place in 1922), than voices were raised warning of the artificiality of this new political homunculus.

These voices became louder and more outspoken when Abdullah assumed the title "King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan" in 1946, and his country was recognized by Britain as a fully independent state. Soon thereafter, in the wake of the Arab-Jewish war in Palestine, King Abdullah annexed that part of Palestine which was occupied by his Arab Legion and changed the name of his country to the "Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan." About two years later (on July 20, 1951), King Abdullah was assassinated at the Mosque of Omar in Jerusalem,

Raphael Patai is a specialist in the anthropology of the Middle East, Israel and the Jews. For 15 years he lived in Palestine, and was the Middle East consultant for the United Nation's Department of Social Affairs. Formerly Visiting Professor of Anthropology at Columbia and Princeton Universities, he is the author of several books including *The Kingdom of Jordan*, *The Republic of Lebanon*, *The Republic of Syria*, and *Israel between East and West*.

during the Friday prayers. His assassin was a young adherent of the former Mufti of Jerusalem.

In the course of the decade that elapsed since the annexation it has become almost a cliché among political observers to talk of the Kingdom of Jordan as an "inviolate" state. The imminent partition of Jordan among Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia was repeatedly predicted. As an alternative, it was envisaged that the young and inexperienced King Hussein, Abdullah's grandson, who assumed effective sovereignty on his eighteenth birthday, on May 2, 1953, would ask his second cousin, the King of Iraq, to annex Jordan *in toto*. More recently, it was feared and foreseen that a coup engineered by Egyptian President Nasser would overthrow the government of Jordan and sweep a new revolutionary government into power which, in turn, would declare its adherence to Nasser and his United Arab Republic.

Hussein's life expectancy was viewed by all as very brief, and his chances to remain at the helm of what is often and belittlingly referred to as his "desert kingdom" as extremely slim. Yet none of these predictions of doom came true. On the contrary, the position of Hussein in Jordan, and that of Jordan in the midst of her Arab sister-states, seem stronger today than they ever were in the past. What has caused these surprising developments in the short history of this "inviolate" state?

A thorough analysis of the historical forces and processes in the Arab world in the course of the last decade would undoubtedly uncover a considerable number of internal as well as external factors whose sum total resulted in the continued existence of the Kingdom of Jordan. One would have to consider the British interest which lay with Jordanian independence as long as Jordan allowed Britain to maintain military bases on her territory. Then one would have to take account of the strains of inter-Arab rivalry which made Iraq and later Saudi Arabia stand by Jordan in the face of mounting Egyptian pressure. One would have to evaluate carefully the Arab fears that any change in the *status quo* of Jordan would be exploited by Israel to occupy the West Bank and push its boundaries eastward to the Jordan river. One would have to try to esti-

mate the role of Jordan as a small pawn in the world-wide game of power politics between the Western democracies and the Eastern totalitarian bloc.

### Growing Nationalism

There can be no doubt that all these factors entered the picture at one time or another and help to maintain the independence of the small "desert kingdom" of Jordan. But there can be equally no doubt that beyond all these contributing elements there has been one additional factor which tipped the often precarious balance of the scales in the direction of survival. This factor has been and is the upsurging Jordanian nationalism.

To begin with, the government and rulers of the state of Jordan could not count on any nationalistic sentiment in the population. When the great upheaval of the annexation of the West Bank took place, two greatly different conglomerations of population elements were thrown together into one political entity. With regard to descent and historical antecedents there were definite differences between the populations of the two Banks. The people of the East Bank were largely descendants of nomadic tribes who, throughout the ages, emerged from the Arabian Desert and either occupied special tribal wandering territories within the present-day boundaries of Jordan or settled down in villages and towns close to the Eastern shore of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea.

The people of the West Bank, on the other hand, looked back on a history of settled existence for many centuries. They were under direct British administration for three decades whereas Transjordan was independent throughout this period in practically all internal matters. The Transjordanians therefore were not exposed to forces and influences which molded the character of the Palestinian Arab population. Old Muslim Middle Eastern traditions survived in Transjordan almost unchanged in such areas as family, social and economic life, while in Palestine much of these customs underwent certain modifications.

As a result of these different experiences the Palestinian Arabs at the time of the annexation were far ahead of the Transjor-



danians in educational attainments, in standard of living, in cultural achievements, in urbanization and in Westernization. A considerable element of the Palestinian Arab population gained administrative experience in the employment of the British Mandatary Government. Also in educational training, in professional work, in social ideas and, last but not least, in political development the Palestinians have outdistanced the Transjordanians.

In the first few years following the annexation all this resulted in considerable tension and resentment between the West Bankers and the East Bankers. The people of the East Bank resented the fact that the Palestinians, whose territory they had conquered and annexed, should claim a cultural superiority and should in fact be able to occupy important and key positions in the country, in government and in professional life. They resented the fact that the West Bankers regarded them with a certain amount of disdain and looked down on them as a backward and uneducated element. The Palestinians, on the other hand, resented the effective rule of a less educated, less experienced and less sophisticated people.

This dissatisfaction was further aggravated by numerical considerations. At the time of the annexation the original Transjordanians numbered about 400,000, while the Palestinians, residents and refugees together, numbered more than twice as many. Whatever positions they were able to achieve in government, in local administration and in other walks of life, they felt that more was due them if only on account of their numerical superiority.

There were considerable differences evident with regard to political orientation. Many of the Palestinians were adherents of the former Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin el-Husseini, the old enemy of King Abdullah, who from his headquarters in Cairo continued to stir up antagonism against Abdullah, his heirs and their governments. They were greatly dissatisfied with the rule of a king and a government they opposed. The Palestinian Arabs differed from the Jordanians also with regard to their attitude to Britain. They were violently anti-British; they bitterly resented the emergence of Israel which they regarded as the work of

the British. The Transjordanians had little or no direct contact with British power. Their feelings towards Britain were lukewarm, or even friendly; the establishment of Israel did not affect them so directly and so traumatically as it did the Palestinians. These differences made it difficult for king and government to weld the Eastern and Western groups together into one people.

This is not the place to recount the tortuous ups and downs of internal Jordanian politics. From a bird's eye view, however, one trend of development seems to emerge clearly enough: The country is rallying more and more to the King. To a great extent, undoubtedly, this is due to the personal qualities of young King Hussein. In weathering a number of coups the King has shown courage and leadership. He unhesitatingly faced personal danger in order to save his throne, and several times he succeeded in emerging unscathed from attacks of physical or propagandistic nature.

Equally important, however, has been the awakening feeling of Jordanian nationalism whose symbolic expression is the person of the young King.

### Background of Nationalism

Nationalism is probably the only Western idea which has been wholeheartedly adopted by the Arabs. In the first two or three decades following the establishment of the Emirate of Transjordan, the national attitudes of its people had the form and the character of an undifferentiated Arab nationalism. Although they knew that they were the citizens of Transjordan and the subjects of Emir Abdullah, their sentiments were generally Arab and their nationalism too was generally Arab rather than specifically Transjordanian. As a result of the annexation, the new country acquired a Palestinian population which had no emotional ties whatsoever with the Jordanian state.

However, in the course of the ten years that have elapsed since, a young generation has grown up which has gone through Jordanian schools or at least has been exposed throughout to "Jordanianism" by means of the radio, the newspapers, the appearances of the King and all those more subtle influences which cannot be escaped if one lives in a state which is a going concern. As a result of

all these factors, the young generation with Transjordanian antecedents has become pronouncedly Jordanian in its nationalistic orientation, and its contemporaries of Palestinian ancestry also seem to develop in the same direction.

One of the basic aspirations of Jordanian nationalism has been the acquisition of all the external trappings of independence and sovereignty. Especially strong has been the urge to remove all relics of British overlordship and tutelage which recalled the days of the Mandate and smacked, however faintly, of imperialistic domination. Therefore it was emotionally impossible for Jordan to adhere to the British-sponsored Baghdad Pact, in December, 1955. Therefore, a few months later, Lieutenant General John Bagot Glubb, commander and builder of Jordan's Arab Legion, had to be dismissed, together with other British officers.

#### **Anti-Westernism**

Because of the identification of the West in general with imperialism, the internal political constellation of Jordan has always been largely anti-Western. The same emotionally-directed considerations prompted the Jordanian government to abrogate the 1948 20-year treaty of alliance and friendship with Britain, and to replace the British annual subsidy of £12 million with a subsidy in the same amount promised, but never paid in full, by Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Jordan insisted on the withdrawal of all British troops. After this was accomplished, however, soon martial law had to be imposed on the country, and unsettled conditions continued to prevail. Street demonstrations became an almost daily occurrence, and Egypt switched on and off at will her propaganda campaign against King Hussein and his government.

Following the establishment of the United Arab Republic, King Hussein and his kinsman King Faisal of Iraq decided on a Hashimite federation of their countries which, however, came to a premature end with the pro-Egyptian Iraqi coup of July, 1958, which cost Faisal his life. In view of the direct Egyptian threat to his throne and

to the independence of his country, King Hussein had to invite Western (British) troops to his country—a bitter pill for a proud, young and nationalistically minded king and his people. When, about three months later, the British troops left, the King nevertheless could feel that he had weathered another crisis, and could leave for a well-deserved vacation and rest. Then came the plane incident which increased the heroic stature of the young King.

#### **Conclusion**

The nature of Jordanian nationalism can now be considered in the light of these most recent events. One sees the pull exerted by the rising star of Nasser, especially on those elements of the Jordanian population who are dissatisfied with their living conditions. These include in the first place the Palestinian refugees, and, in the second, the other Palestinians. This pull, however, is counteracted by the emerging feelings of Jordanian nationalism, increasing as years go by and as the King, and with him his country, can chalk up one victory after the other over his internal and external enemies: the pro-Egyptian elements in Jordan and Nasser and his followers across the borders.

Undoubtedly, most young Jordanians, like the young people in all Arab countries, feel that, in principle, all Arabs are brothers and that therefore there should be close ties among all the Arab states. But in Jordan, again as in other Arab countries, the old traditional view of state organization as a vastly enlarged family grouping still prevails. And if the family is the prototype of the state, then the principle of greater cohesion within the closer family-group applies to the state as well, in the sense that the first loyalty must be given to one's own country while the interests of pan-Arabism must take second place.

Ten years are, of course, insufficient to develop a deep-seated sense of national identity in a people. But a decade is long enough to register the beginnings of a trend which, if it continues, can become a solid foundation for the development of a solid Jordanian national consciousness.

*In Iraq, "the new regime has evidently been accepted with little question by the country at large," but this British authority notes that it must face many internal and external problems.*

# The Revolution in Iraq

By SIR JOHN TROUTBECK

*Former British Ambassador to Iraq*

WHEN the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end of the First World War and the Turks were finally driven out of what is now Iraq, they left a country singularly primitive and poverty-stricken. The great majority of its two or three million inhabitants<sup>1</sup> scratched a bare existence from a land as neglected as the population itself. Such wealth as there was was in the hands of very few and literacy was to be found only among a small, though already politically minded, minority. The responsibility for administering this territory fell upon the British who had conquered it. They had also to determine its future. Direct British rule could only be a temporary solution not only because of promises already made but because of the protests of the British taxpayer. The Iraqis must learn to govern themselves, but it was the British who had to decide how. Despite the unpromising conditions they not unnaturally chose the system which they knew and which had proved so successful in their own country—representational parliamentary democracy headed by a constitutional monarch. But even the monarch had to be found from outside, because inter-family jealousies excluded the possibility of a native monarch.

So the British Government turned to the Hashimite house which had already played

so notable a part both in the Allied cause and in the Arabs' early struggle for freedom. The Hashimites traced their ancestry to the prophet Mahomet and had for centuries been the hereditary guardians of the holy places of Mecca and Medina. During the 1914 war it was the Emir Hussein, then head of the house, who proclaimed the Arab revolt and it was his son Faisal who, accompanied by T. E. Lawrence, led the Arab forces in the field. To crown the victory the Syrians proclaimed Faisal king and for a short period he was king in Damascus, while at intervals pleading the Arab cause at the Versailles Conference. Unhappily he was no friend of the French and when the French assumed the mandate for Syria, they drove him out and brought his kingdom to an end. But the British Government did not forget him or his family and when they decided that a constitutional monarchy was needed in Iraq, Faisal was their choice.

It proved to be a happy one. King Faisal's personality quickly impressed the Iraqis and he became the cornerstone of Iraq's political organization. Though in theory circumscribed by constitutional restrictions, he in fact played an all-important part in creating the new state. He alone could stand above the petty bickerings of the politicians. One of the worst disasters that has befallen Iraq was his early death in 1933. If he had lived, who knows if Iraq would not have avoided an infinity of subsequent trouble? For it is an unfortunate fact that his successors never won an equal respect. His son Ghazi, who succeeded him, had none of his wisdom and temperance. He was killed six years later in a car accident, to be succeeded in turn by his only son, another Faisal, who was still a child.

Sir John Troutbeck served as British Ambassador to Iraq from 1951 to 1954. Prior to this, he was the head of the British Middle East Office in Cairo, Egypt. Mr. Troutbeck has also served as Secretary of the British Embassy in Turkey and of the British Legation in Ethiopia.

<sup>1</sup> The present population is estimated at about 6½ million.

For 14 years the boy's uncle, the Emir Abdul Illah, acted as regent and it was he who had to bear the brunt of the Second World War and its aftermath, of the Nazi-inspired revolt in 1941 which all but cost him his life, and the prolonged riots which followed the signing of the abortive Treaty of Portsmouth with Britain in 1948. Englishmen who knew his well believe that his country owes him a great debt. What however is incontestable is that Iraqis refused to acknowledge it, at any rate in recent years. As time went on he became less and less popular.

When the young King at last came of age in 1953, there was a general hope that Abdul Illah would fade into the background; but on the contrary he remained at the King's elbow to guide him in his early footsteps. After all the boy was only 18 and had spent little of his life in Iraq. The result was that, while the King himself won all hearts by his youth and his gentle disposition, the monarchy as such, instead of being the stabilizing factor that the first Faisal had made it, became an object of indifference. The all important part that Abdul Illah, now Crown Prince, continued to play in Iraq's political life caused increasing resentment, for it was generally believed that it was his influence, together with Nuri es-Said's, that was still predominant in foreign affairs, in the forming and unforming of governments and in the making of military appointments.

Below the Palace were the other organs of government that the British had set up—a cabinet of Ministers presided over by a Prime Minister, a Parliament of two chambers and an electorate based on universal male suffrage. These democratic forms, having no roots, were in effect no more than a facade. Elections indeed were held but few candidates could stand for election, let alone be elected, other than those chosen by the Palace or the Prime Minister. So-called political parties were formed from time to time but were little more than cliques to support an ambitious politician. Debates took place in Parliament but had no influence on government policy. Apart from the Palace, power in fact rested with a small ruling class whose members held office for a few months at a time till they were ousted as a result of internal quarrels, deadlock or royal disfavor.<sup>2</sup> Many of them made large for-

tunes in the course of their political life.

As the years passed, one man emerged among the politicians as the unrivalled wielder of power—Nuri es-Said. None could match him in ability, self-assurance and political courage and, as his possible rivals declined or disappeared, he was left pre-eminent. No major decisions were made without consulting him, whether he happened at the moment to be nominally in office or not. So in the last years of the old regime there were two powers that controlled Iraq—the Palace, which to the ordinary Iraqi meant the Crown Prince, and Nuri es-Said. Behind them, so Iraqis believed, stood the British Embassy, a force frightening in its ability to persuade or, in the last resort, to compel.

### Nuri es-Said

Nuri was a man who would have made his mark in any country. Of humble origin he started his career as an officer in the Turkish army, from which he deserted to join King Hussein and the army of the Arab Revolt in 1916. To the tragic end of his days he remained loyal to his early principles. He was an Arab patriot and a devoted servant of the Hashimite house. He saw Arab destiny as linked with the West and above all with Britain. Not for him the lures of neutrality or the itch to play off Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia against the West.

But also not for him any sympathy with new-fangled notions of social reform which the younger generation were learning from the West. He had been brought up in Ottoman ideas and believed profoundly that the East must solve its social problems in its own way. His critics complained that he was not interested in social problems at all but devoted all his energies to a foreign policy of which they themselves heartily disapproved. Yet they could not but recognize his ability and fear his power.

As he grew older and enemies from outside were added to those in Iraq itself, he became less tolerant of criticism. He believed he knew what was best for Iraq and silenced his critics by packing Parliament, dissolving the political parties, muzzling the press and clamping the more obstreperous of

<sup>2</sup> See Stephen D. Longrigg, *Iraq 1900 to 1950*, pages 395 ff.



his enemies in jail. So despite his humor, his charm and his winning personality, despite the progress latterly being made in economic development for which he had found the funds in hard fought negotiation with the Iraq Petroleum Company, he with the Crown Prince became the target of hatred and bitterness among large sections of the Iraqi public. In the army he had long had enemies owing to the belief that he begrudged it the money needed for its welfare and progress. To the intelligentsia he became the symbol of all that they wished to end both in home and foreign policy.

### The Middle Class

One of the most striking features of Arab life since the First World War has been the rise and expansion of a literate middle class, the result of the impact of the West. Iraq was no exception. Many of those who passed through the increasing number of schools and colleges entered government service. That was indeed their primary ambition. Others took to medicine, the law, teaching, journalism, and so on. For the great majority there was small prospect of worldly success. They could expect little better than some ill-paid job without power or influence and suffered accordingly from a deep sense of frustration. This was the class from which Colonel Nasser was drawn and to which he made his strongest appeal. When the middle class people looked about them they saw (or thought they saw) a land racked with poverty and disease, ruled by a small class of self-seekers to which they could never hope to belong, its chief source of wealth owned and exploited by foreigners, its policy controlled by the great Christian Powers which had never respected the Arabs' most sacred aims.

The creation of Israel in particular was neither forgiven nor forgotten. In the past the tenets of Islam had taught its adherents to accept the buffetings of fate as the will of God, but the younger generation were no longer bound by the old restraints. They looked for a new God and found it in a fanatical nationalism. Here they saw the answer to their problems. They had the vision of a rejuvenated Arab nation which would sweep away all traces of foreign control,

clear all Arab territory of alien encroachment, humble the mighty whether they were princes, landlords or corrupt politicians and create a brave new Arab world which could take its seat proudly among the nations. In this world there would be no more poverty and disease, no more opulent palaces, no more bribery and corruption.

This was a revolutionary conception, more powerful in its ability to destroy than in its capacity to construct. Its ideas of construction were indeed those of a dream world. Constructive activity was in fact already in progress under the guidance of a Development Board with immense resources at its disposal and the benefit of foreign advisers. But its patient procedures and long-term aims were only a source of irritation to those who demanded immediate results. Nor did these visionaries ever dream of going out into the country to see for themselves what was being done. They gathered their information from coffee house talk, the press and later the Cairo radio.

The first object of their venom was Britain. The fact that Iraq owed its very existence to Britain was ignored, if it was indeed realized. This generation knew only that British soldiers had long occupied their country and were still to be seen in military bases on its soil, that Iraq was bound by a so-called treaty of alliance to this imperialist Power, that the British Embassy directed its policy, that a British company was robbing it of its wealth of oil, that Britain supported and kept in power the "feudalists" who held up all progress while they amassed their ill-gotten gains, above all that Britain had brought the Jews into Palestine and by a policy of divide and rule was preventing the old dream of Arab unity from becoming a reality.

Such were the daily themes of the Press. Yet such is the Iraqi character that visiting Englishmen would be struck only by the friendliness of all around them, and countless Englishmen (including the present writer) who have lived in Iraq remember only the kindness and welcome they received from every class of its citizens.

For the government of Iraq, which came to mean more and more Nuri es-Said, the problems were not easy. Nuri es-Said too was an old believer in Arab unity; indeed

the union of the Fertile Crescent had long been one of his great aims. He too felt deeply the injustice of the Palestine situation. He too aimed to bring an end to the British military bases and to get greater benefit for Iraq from her oil resources. But in certain fundamentals he and the intellectuals were at opposite poles. He believed that Iraq's future lay in co-operation with Britain, he profoundly distrusted both Soviet Russia and Nasserite Egypt and he was bitterly opposed to revolutionary social ideals.

His policy was not without results. Many years back it had brought Iraq into the League of Nations. After the Second World War he negotiated a new agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company which brought immense wealth to Iraq and made possible vast schemes of development. By a special agreement with Britain attached to the Bagdad Pact he brought the old British bases under Iraqi control without losing British support. He obtained military assistance from the United States.

But on other issues he never achieved success. He failed to bring about union with Syria or any other Arab country except at the last moment with Jordan. More important, he was defeated by the Palestine problem. Here collaboration with Britain could not help, for neither Britain nor the other Western Powers could obtain for him the minimum that Arab opinion might accept, if indeed it would have accepted any compromise.

#### **Bagdad Pact**

Yet even more than the failure over Palestine it was perhaps the Bagdad Pact that proved to be the first step towards Nuri's downfall. It is still something of a mystery who inspired the Pact, but Nuri must certainly be reckoned as one of its originators. It had always been his belief that Iraq, and indeed the whole Arab world, needed Western support for its protection. When he came to considering plans in the 1950's, his first idea was to base the defense on the Arab Collective Security Pact reinforced by Western participation. It was only when Colonel Nasser demurred that he conceived a different plan. He claimed afterwards to have had the green light from Colonel Nasser and maybe he hoped that

as the majority of signatories of the new pact would be Eastern countries, criticism from Arab nationalists would then be allayed.

If so he was grievously mistaken. Colonel Nasser regarded his initiative as an affront, indeed as a deliberate defiance of Egypt's claim to Arab leadership. The pact did indeed present an easy target for Egyptian propaganda, for by the inclusion of Britain it was another agreement with imperialism, and that at a time when Arab opinion was turning more and more to "positive neutrality." Cairo accordingly turned all its heaviest weapons of propaganda against the rulers of Iraq, dubbing them traitors to the Arab cause, lackeys of imperialism, reactionary feudalists, whose liquidation was the duty of every patriotic Iraqi. The cry was enthusiastically taken up by nationalists in every Arab state. Such propaganda, pouring from Cairo radio day in and day out, slowly undermined Nuri's position with his own public.

Worse was to follow. The Anglo-French operation against Suez, conducted as in apparent collaboration with Israel, roused unspeakable bitterness in the Arab world. The Arab friends of Britain were placed in an impossible situation. It was useless for Nuri to break off relations with France and have Britain excluded from the Bagdad Pact Organization. His whole policy down the years had been based on co-operation with Britain. Equally he had never concealed his distrust of Soviet Russia. And now Russia—so all Arabs believed—had come to their aid in their hour of need and forced the imperialists to call the operation off. Colonel Nasser did not fail to drive the lesson home. Nothing was left to Nuri but to hold on, keep his enemies in check and hope that by some stroke of fortune his policy might still be justified. There was at any rate the Development Board which had now got into its stride. As wealth increased and was diffused through the country, discontent might weaken and Iraqis come to see that Nuri was right after all.

Yet once again Colonel Nasser produced a new trick like a rabbit out of a hat. Arab unity had always been the dream. Nuri had tried and failed to realize it. Now

Colonel Nasser took the first concrete step in establishing a union with Syria. For the government of Iraq and still more of Jordan this was an alarming development. Unity was one thing, unity under revolutionary Egypt quite another. The two governments at once created a rival union.

But this was a union without roots. Iraqis saw it only as an unwelcome burden imposed upon them to shore up a palpably unviable state and to do so in the interest of a royal house which, whatever its earlier contribution to the Arab cause, now represented little but an outmoded tradition. On the one side was the revolutionary ardor of a new class and a new generation, on the other two boy kings whose pride was in their ancestry and whose nearest advisers were elderly men steeped in the past.

As long as opposition was confined to the civilian intelligentsia, the regime was not in serious danger. It was the defection of the army that brought about its downfall. It was not the first time that the Iraqi army had intervened in politics but since the failure of the revolt in 1941 it had stuck to its trade, and the hope was that in case of need it would stand by the King to whom it owed allegiance.

#### Revolt of July 14

It is still not clear how its loyalty was undermined. Some of the leaders were men of deep religious faith unlikely to be attracted to modern ideas. Nevertheless the great bulk of officers were, as in Egypt and Syria, drawn from the same class that produced the discontented intellectuals and so were exposed to the same influences. Some too were no doubt disgruntled by frustrated ambition and had a personal grudge against the Palace. As for Nuri the army, as already related, had its own reasons for disliking him and some now feared that he might try to use it for crushing the revolt in Lebanon or for invading Syria. Even service in Jordan was highly unpopular.

Neither the Palace nor the Government seem to have been aware of what was brewing, and the events of July 14 took everyone by surprise. Indeed it appears that even the leaders of the revolt only decided at the last moment that their opportunity had arrived. Their immediate objective was to dispose of

the Crown Prince and Nuri. Whether it was their intention also to kill the King may never be known. Their next act was to seize the wireless station and call out the mob, but after it had set fire to the British Embassy and savaged the Jordanian members of the Union Government, the mob was brought under some measure of control.

A new government quickly established itself, consisting of the chief conspirators, assisted by Nuri's most uncompromising political opponents both of the Right and the Left. A council of three was installed to fill the place of Head of State. The new government at once turned its attention to the representatives of the former regime. The Ministers of the old government were arrested, their property sequestered and they themselves were put on trial in a special court. The same fate befell many others, including some senior officers. The members of the Development Board were dismissed and the Board itself was reconstituted as a Cabinet Committee. Many senior officials in the government and local administrations lost their jobs and some foreign advisers were sent home.

It is too early to predict the future. Even information about the present is heavily censored. The new regime has evidently been accepted with little question by the country at large, but its problems both internal and external are many. Already there have been signs of rift among the leaders. Both development and administration cannot fail to suffer from the loss of so many experienced men, both Iraqi and foreign, for which the rapid recruitment of Egyptians can hardly compensate. The Kurdish minority may see its opportunity to make trouble once again. Externally, though the union with Jordan was abruptly denounced, relations have still to be regulated with the United Arab Republic and also with the non-Arab Powers. The new government seems to be walking warily. It has not for example so far denounced the Bagdad Pact, through fear perhaps of losing Western military aid.

How it will all end is anyone's guess. Iraqis have always been known for their turbulence and their latest revolution is unlikely to herald an era of tranquillity, foreign alike to their history and their temperament.

*This author discusses Turkish politics in the Middle East and her policies in dealing with the West. "In conclusion it may perhaps be suggested that on balance the development of Turkish nationalism since the Second World War has brought Turkey progressively into line with the forces operating within and among the nations of the Western non-Communist world."*

## Turkish Nationalism in the Postwar World

By ELLEN D. ELLIS

*Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Mount Holyoke College*

THE character of Turkish nationalism was firmly established and important steps in its development had been taken before the close of the second World War. The first stirrings of a genuine nationalist movement arose from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire as the end of the First World War approached. The roots of the movement, however, reach deep into the Turkish past. The government of the empire had for centuries not been master of its own house. The non-Turkish minorities had been organized into religious communities under the respective jurisdictions of their religious heads.

Nationals of foreign countries residing in Turkey had had their own administrative officers and had lived in many respects according to the law of their own states. They had enjoyed inviolability of domicile and exemption from personal taxes. Many Western governments had maintained their own post offices on Turkish soil uncontrolled by Turkish rule. At the eve of the First World War

the training of the armed services of Turkey was in the hands of Europeans—that of the army under German officers, that of the navy under British and that of the gendarmerie under French. The interventions of the Powers in Turkish affairs during the nineteenth century are well known to all.

Mustapha Kemal (Ataturk), like other Young Turk leaders, was fiercely resentful of these conditions and determined that they must come to an end. Now, galvanized into action by Turkey's defeat at the hands of the Allies and still more poignantly by the British and French inspired invasion of Asia Minor, Kemal arose as the "miraculous" leader of his people. Ignoring the humiliating Treaty of Sèvres which the Allies had wrung from a powerless Sultan, Kemal resolutely turned his back on the larger dimensions of the Ottoman past to accept the more restricted but more substantial realities of the Turkish present.

By the magic of his leadership he rallied around him the Muslim Turkish population residing in Anatolia and inspired them with the dynamics of a Turkish as contrasted with an Ottoman nationalism—the idea of a Turkey for the Turks. For the implementation of a true Turkish nationalism capable of sustaining a modern nation-state Ataturk saw that the cohesive power of a common mores and tradition could be depended upon only in part. His deep insight discerned that in many respects pride in or reliance on the past must give place to newly generated forces based on the legitimate aspirations of an enlightened people concerned rather with their future.

In this spirit he labored indefatigably for the further emancipation of women and for

Ellen D. Ellis is well known to our readers for her studies of United States government and of the Middle East. Formerly head of the History Department at Constantinople College, she also served as acting librarian at Istanbul Women's College in 1946-1947. Long a member of the Department of History, and the first chairman of the Department of Political Science at Mount Holyoke College, where she is again teaching temporarily, she has also served as Professor of Political Science at the Holyoke Junior College.



their social, political, legal and professional equality with men, for the eradication of illiteracy, and for the loosening of the hold of Islamic religious traditionalism over all the Turkish people which he believed to be responsible for attitudes of mind and social institutions detrimental to their survival as a nation in the twentieth century. Always he had in mind the development of Turkey not as an industrialized totalitarianism motivated solely by materialistic values, but rather as an evolving free democratic community with political institutions based on Western models.

Much visible progress was made along these lines during Ataturk's life. The essentially democratic nature of the purpose animating him is to be seen in his deep interest in the Turkish people as human beings rather than as a great monolithic mass, the "toiling masses" of the Marxian system. He made every effort to become one of them—in his mingling with them socially not only in night clubs and hotels but in his own home in Ankara, and on the bathing beaches around Istanbul. He appeared commonly in civilian clothes. He himself traveled throughout Turkey giving instruction in the new Latin alphabet. His essential interest in the human individual was consistently expressed in his pronouncements to them.

His belief in the individual is evident, further, in his measures "to separate ideas of religion from politics and from the affairs of the world and of the state," in the words of the constitution. Ataturk's religious measures were directed not against religion as such. In advocating the elimination of the provision of the original constitution whereby "the religion of the Turkish State . . . [was] Islam," Ataturk declared that if a state means to be "equally just" towards all its subjects, despite differences of religious profession and also towards its own subjects and foreigners "it is obliged to respect freedom of opinion and conscience" and to do so "unambiguously." In "étatisme" as one of the "six cardinal principles" of the constitution, the Turkish state was committed to a system in which "while private capitalistic enterprise should be the prevailing economic form in Turkey, the state should step in where private capital should not be adequate for national prosperity."<sup>1</sup>

In the short 15 years during which Ataturk was spared to the Republic, his unremitting efforts to bring about modifications in the underlying mores of the people precluded marked development towards popular government. In some instances the stupendous economic and social innovations that he considered essential led him to exercise autocratic, even ruthless power against those who put opposition or obstruction in his way. His ultimate democratic objective remained, however, always the same.

In some respects political foundations for the future were being laid. Ataturk believed strongly in discussion, thus evidencing here, also, his confidence in man's reason and judgment in political affairs. In the early days of the Republic he founded the People's Party of the Republic and then welcomed the formation of the Republican Progressive Party as an opposition group, and, in 1930, the appearance of the Free Party. Both of these were dissolved soon after their initiation as hot beds, it was claimed, of the reactionary forces the extinction of which Ataturk held essential for the Republic, as well as of subversion and corruption on the part of dissident groups unaccustomed to the legitimate methods of party government. It is probable that the lack of political experience on both sides may have contributed to their demise.

Throughout these early years, it should be noted, Turkish nationalism was being directed along lines in which extremism played little part. Desire for power was not a motivating force, power either for Ataturk himself or for the Turkish state. The old Ottoman imperialism was dead. Ataturk desired only that the new Turkish Republic should be sufficiently strong to defend itself against the imperialist ambitions of other states. The only territory that has been added since the Treaty of Lausanne is that of Hatay, including the strategic port of Alexandretta, now Iskenderun, at the extreme northeast corner of the Mediterranean, where the Syrian border runs with the Turkish. And this territory was acquired not directly by force, but through a combination of tortured and controversial negotiation and League of Nations procedures.

<sup>1</sup> E. D. Ellis, "Political Growth in Turkey," *Current History*, February, 1948, pp. 96-7.

With this exception Ataturk saw Turkey, in spite of its head start among Middle Eastern states, not in an expansionist role but as a state among states, dependent upon friendly cooperation with other members of the Family of Nations. This is evident in his public utterances as well as in his dealings with other countries.

In order [he declared in his Six-Day Speech], that our nation shall be able to enjoy a strong happy stable existence, it is essential for the state to pursue a wholly national policy . . . for the true happiness and prosperity of our nation and country . . . by reliance above all upon our own strength; . . . and to look forward to civilized, human dealing and reciprocal friendship from the civilized world.<sup>2</sup>

Between Ataturk's death in 1938 and the close of the Second World War in 1945, Turkish nationalism followed the direction he had set, and unspectacularly—with indeed, suggestions of retrogression in some respects. Although Turkey did not enter the war until 1945, the pressures of global war pushed upon her, with the result that the role of the state in her economic life was greatly extended. State monopolies sprang up on all sides. During this period, too, restrictions upon the press became more onerous.

The end of the war brought a heightened tempo to Turkey's evolving nationalism. Hidden political stirrings rose to the surface. In 1946, more than a dozen political parties became active, some of which were suppressed under the Law of Associations, for their allegedly extremely radical aims; some of which died a natural death. Other than the Democratic Party the only one to assume any importance in national affairs was the conservative Party of the Nation, and it was to be dissolved in 1953, charged with having advocated the re-establishment of a theocratic state, with all the social implications therein involved. The Republican Nation Party and the Freedom Party appeared somewhat later.

The readiness with which existing governments in Turkey have done away with burgeoning splinter parties inevitably raises some questions in the minds of those accustomed to democratic ideas and practices. In the search for answers it is perhaps not

inappropriate to ask one's self, among other things, whether, given all the factors in the situation, Turkey's relative freedom from the violence that has erupted in other Middle East countries as they have advanced towards nationhood, may not be attributed in part to the fact that extremism was thus prevented from reaching the explosive stage. It was believed, further, that Russian communist incitement was behind the emergence of some of these party groups.

In the election of 1946, the Democratic Party won 60 out of the 465 seats in the Grand National Assembly, thus becoming the official Opposition in that body. This development brought in its turn the separation of the leadership of the People's Party from the office of the President of the Republic, both of which functions had been combined in Ismet Inönü as they had been in Ataturk before him. It brought also the correspondingly greater importance of the Prime Minister as the active leader of his party, as in the typical parliamentary regime.

In the election of 1950, as in 1954 and 1957, the Democratic Party was returned with very impressive majorities.<sup>3</sup> In 1950, the People's Party, which had singlehandedly controlled Turkey for 27 years, yielded place in the best parliamentary form and tradition to a newcomer in the field with only four years' experience in parliamentary procedures.

In spite of its disadvantageous position in the Grand National Assembly which—in the Turkish electoral system—does not reflect its actual strength in the country at large, the Republican People's Party has maintained its existence and Turkey has managed to develop what may be regarded as an effective two-party regime. In 1957 the People's Party won 173 seats in the parliament.

As the emergence of two major parties reveals a more active public opinion and at the same time affords greater opportunity for the expression of political views, so in the matter of religion the rigidities of the Ataturk regime have yielded somewhat to a popular demand that the Islamic religion should be

<sup>2</sup> Eleanor Bisbee, *The New Turks*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951.

<sup>3</sup> According to the *Parliamentary Hand Book of the World*, the Democratic Party won 408 seats out of 487 in 1950; 504 out of 541 in 1954; and 421 out of 610 in 1957.

permitted to play a larger role in Turkish society. Training schools for the clergy have been opened; religious instruction may again be obtained in the schools; a coeducational divinity school has been established in the University of Ankara; the call to prayer is heard once more in the original Arabic. The government is adamant, however, in its determination that these offerings shall be optional and shall bring no return of an Islamic state.

### Censorship

A somewhat opposite trend has appeared since 1946 with regard to the press. After a period of greater protection for publishers and editors, heavy restrictions were reimposed in the Press Law of 1954. While previous-to-publication censorship, forbidden in the constitution, has not been applied, an extremely broad interpretation has been given to an "insult" to an individual's "dignity," harm to the political honor or national reputation of the state, or the creation of "alarm or anxiety in public opinion" as in the wording of the law. The result has been a large number of suspensions of publications as well as the fining and imprisonment of editors.

Here, again, certain considerations should probably enter into one's final judgment. Democratic institutions and democratic civil liberties are still in their youth in Turkey, and the restraint essential to the legitimate exercise of liberty is difficult to learn. The true function of a political party in a democratic society, as an organ of continual reasonable discussion and fair competition rather than a weapon of destruction activated by emotion, is learned only by experience. The role of an effective opposition is one hard for either majority or minority to comprehend. Additional factors in the situation may lie in the insufficiency of laws against libel in Turkey, as well as in the convinced opinion on the part of many that subversive Communist influence is making itself felt in the extremist press. A modicum of comfort can perhaps be found in the disinterested courage of the more responsible journalists who in laying before the public the truth as they have seen it have disregarded the great risk involved; they have

thereby incurred not only financial loss but frequently jail sentences as well.

Turkey's general economic condition in the post-war period has presented a confusing picture. Private investment by both Turks and foreigners has been encouraged. Many large projects have been initiated for the development of Turkey's natural resources. Insufficient coordination of the various phases of economic life, together with the necessity of keeping an unduly large number of men under arms, has had at least temporary untoward results—a serious imbalance of payments, a lack of consumers' goods, a depreciation of the value of the currency, to mention only a few. A new stability program was introduced in August, 1958, as one consequence of which the United States, after previous hesitation, has decided to make further advances to Turkey to assist her in implementing the program.

### Foreign Policy

In its external aspects Turkish nationalism since the Second World War has been defensive rather than aggressive, cooperative rather than isolationist. No expansionist tendencies whatever have appeared. Turkey has, rather, continued, in a constantly shrinking world, to seek the help of nations with objectives like her own, and at the same time to put her resources at the disposal of such friendly nations in a common defense against forces bent on the destruction of all democratic systems alike. Her long experience vis-à-vis Russia has given her a clearer and steadier perception of the Russian-Communist threat than that possessed by most other countries, and she has never flinched in meeting it. She received the menacing U.S.S.R. communications of 1946 with regard to the Black Sea provinces and the Straits with courage and determination, with the result that in 1953 the U.S.S.R. relinquished her claims and demands.

Recognizing the basic solidarity of interest existing among all sections of the non-Communist world Turkey accepted with gratitude the military and financial assistance offered to her by the United States under the Truman Plan and the Economic Recovery Program for Europe of the Marshall Plan. She has since 1945 been a convinced member of the United Nations. In 1949 she was admitted to the Council of Europe. Her

constant support of the United States was evidenced by the active role she played throughout the Korean crisis. When, under the impact of the Communist threat it became clear that smaller groupings were necessary, Turkey sought a part in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to which she was admitted in 1951. To this organization she has made substantial contributions, especially in allowing the stationing at Izmir of the Sixth Tactical Air Force and the stationing of naval bases and air fields throughout her territory.

With the same general purpose in view Turkey has entered into other treaties of Alliance, notably the 1953 Ankara Pact of Friendship and Collaboration with Greece and Yugoslavia, later converted into a military alliance. She has become the enthusiastic leader in implementing the Northern Tier Defense Concept, a plan for the defense of the northern Middle East countries bordering on Russia, which has eventuated in the Baghdad Pact of 1955 among Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Britain and Iran, and, as a near-member, the United States. Turkey has become a member also of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the European Payments Union. Through her membership in the more characteristically Western organizations on the one hand and the Baghdad Pact on the other, she has become the vital link in the organization of the non-Communist world in its effort to meet Russian Communist expansionism.

Turkey has steered a cautious course in her attitude towards the Arab Middle East. The Arab states were resentful when she did not support them in the Palestinian War of 1948. The Hatay incident was another irritating factor, as was her entry into the Northern Tier Defense System, which, in including Iraq, made a breach in the Arab League. In 1955, Turkey, her commitments already tied securely to the West, rejected an attempt by Egypt to draw her into a regional arrangement based on the Arab Collective Security Pact among members of the Arab League.

Throughout this period Turkey has, nevertheless, been at pains on every possible occasion to reiterate her desire to remain in "affectionate and fraternal" relations with

her Arab neighbors, including Egypt under Abdel Nasser. In an attempt in 1956 to maintain such friendship, as well as to protect the Baghdad Pact, she broke diplomatic relations with Israel over the Suez incidents. She has not, however, identified herself with the Arab-Asian bloc in the United Nations nor with the new "neutralism." Throughout the Suez affair Turkey hewed straight to the United States line in reliance upon and support of the United Nations—with, it may be suggested, its chief emphasis upon procedure rather than upon substance, a course of action which greatly strengthened and enhanced Nasser's position in the Arab world. More recently, she has felt obliged to take cognizance of the unfriendly attitude towards her of Egypt and Syria, and to recognize the part played in the Arab world by Russian Communist imperialism and, perhaps, by implication, of Nasser's expansionist ambitions. Consistently with this, Turkey endorsed the sending of United States troops into Lebanon in the summer of 1958 "to preserve the independence of that country against subversive acts organized from without," according to "News From Turkey" of July 23, 1958, which continues: "The Turkish Government considers this action to be an implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine." She approved also the sending of British troops into Jordan.

The problem of Cyprus has been seething since 1934. The struggle has been carried on from the side of Greece and the Greek Cypriotes some of the time in the name of "Enosis," the annexation of Cyprus to the homeland (Greece); sometimes in that of "self-determination"; sometimes in the name of self-government, most recently in that of "independence." Common to all these proposals for a change of status for the island has been the condition that the decision should be determined by vote of the population of the island as a whole, the result of which would be clearly predictable inasmuch as about 76 per cent of the island population are, or think of themselves as, Greek.

The remaining large segment is Turkish and Turkey considers Cyprus as, in essence, "an integral part" of the Turkish homeland, not only by reason of its political history but also of its nearness to the mainland and its strategic position as "vital to Turk-



ish security." As regards "self-determination," Turkey holds that this principle—if such it be—cannot rightly be applied to the people of the island as a whole. She maintains that there is no necessary relation between self-determination and the fact that Cyprus is geographically an island; and that self-determination can under existing circumstances be more rightly applied to the two groups separately than to the whole population as such. Herein, it may be noted, Turkey has hit upon the difficult core always concealed in this most controversial matter of "self-determination," the core problem of the dissident minority whose political destiny has so frequently since 1918 been decided by others than themselves under the aegis of "self-determination." Turkey also believes that the agitation of the Cypriote Greeks has in large measure been fomented by Communist influence. She points out that in 1952 the Progressive People's Party, which she holds to be Communist and Russian-controlled, declared itself for Enosis.

Turkey is primarily in favor of the continuance of the *status quo* for Cyprus. Hard pressed, however, by circumstances, she has since early in 1957 indicated a willingness to accept the "partition" of the island as probably the best practical solution. Under "partition" the political destinies of Cypriote Greeks and Cypriote Turks would be determined by the two separate groups, the assumption being that they would vote to join Greece and Turkey respectively. The Greek elements have rejected this proposal, and Great Britain has until very recently been unsympathetic. Feelings on both sides have found expression in violence both in Turkey and in Cyprus.

Britain's latest experiment to meet the situation has been the attempt to put into effect a "tridominium" in the island. Under this plan for a seven year period Cyprus would be under the joint administration of three resident special representatives of Great Britain, Greece and Turkey respectively. Turkey has accepted this proposal and together with Great Britain is attempting to implement it, seeing in it a possible intermediary step towards eventual partition. In the words of the Turkish Foreign Minister, "it does at least pave the way to a possibility of cooperation among the two

communities and the two governments interested in the Cyprus problem . . . [and] "provide[s] for both communities . . . the means of achieving a democratic system of government." (News From Turkey, October 22, 1958.) The Greek Cypriotes have so far held aloof. A Turkish Representative has been sent to Cyprus.

Turkey has consistently held herself ready to discuss the Cyprus issue with the other interested states, within the United Nations, or outside that organization.

From one point of view it may be argued that the attitude adopted in the Cyprus situation by both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriotes was an expression of nationalism carried to the point of splitting wide open the Greek-Yugoslav-Turkish Alliance and of bringing about a serious breach in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, thereby endangering the peace and security not only of the Eastern Mediterranean but of Western Europe and the democratic world. On the other side there is the consideration that Turkey has seen in the establishment of Greek power over Cyprus the possibility of a repetition of the Greek invasion after the First World War. She has also believed that since in her opinion the movement for Enosis was largely Communist-inspired its success would mean in reality an extension of Communist power and influence at her front door. It is to be noted, further, that Great Britain has not wished to relinquish what has been her strategic position in Cyprus. The question therefore remains as to which may portend the greater danger to the security of Europe and the West—the present disaffection of Greece as a result of the Cyprus struggle or the projected annexation of Cyprus to Greece with its implications.

In conclusion it may perhaps be suggested that on balance the development of Turkish nationalism since the Second World War has brought Turkey progressively into line with the forces operating within and among the nations of the Western non-Communist world. One may, it is believed, go further and suggest that nationalism in Turkey since the Second World War has proved itself to be on the whole mature and moderate, enlightened and steady, in a period of revolutionary turmoil and change in the Middle East and in the world at large.

*Saudi politics, society and government are examined in this discussion of nationalism in Saudi Arabia and the maintenance of its independence. According to this author, "... friendly intercourse with the leaders of the members of the Arab League, ... resistance to dominance by any foreign power, and ... adherence to the religion of Islam" characterize Saudi policy.*

# Nationalism in Saudi Arabia

By K. S. TWITCHELL

*Author of Saudi Arabia*

**S**AUDI ARABIA is such a young nation that something of its origin must be known in order to understand its present status.

The foundation was laid by the late king popularly known as "Ibn Saud," but by his own people as "Abdul Aziz," meaning "Servant of the Beloved." His full name was Abdul Aziz ibn-Abdul Rahman Al Faisal Al Saud. He was born in the palace in Riyadh, Nejd, in November, 1880.

The birth of the present nation came in 1901 when Ibn Saud captured the capital city, Riyadh. The compelling force was the recovery of his father's kingdom and his own home.

His conquests of the provinces of Hasa, Hijaz and Asir besides Nejd followed, but it was not until 1926 that the consolidation was completed. His title of "Sultan of Najd and Its Dependencies" was changed to the much simpler form, "King of Saudi Arabia" in 1934. This perpetuates his family name.

The conquests could not have been made

without the great religious spirit of Wahabism. This puritanical, and at times, fanatical belief, was the uniting force for the "Ikhwan" or Brotherhood. These were the warriors who swept all before them in most of the Arabian Peninsula under the vigorous leadership of Ibn Saud Abdul Aziz. There was no nationalism, only religious fervor, similar to that of the Cromwellian period.

With his characteristic foresight Ibn Saud made provision for his successor. On May 11, 1933, there was a royal decree to this effect. In 1946, Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, Ambassador to Britain, stated that Crown Prince Saud had been designated by his father to be the next king, that the "Ulema" or religious council had ratified this appointment and in addition that all Saud's adult brothers had sworn allegiance to him. Hence when King Abdul Aziz died November 9, 1953, it is not surprising that Saud ascended the throne with no opposition. Saud was born in 1902.

One of the first acts of King Saud was to appoint his eldest brother, Prince Faisal, as Crown Prince holding the portfolios of Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Finance, with far-reaching powers. Due to illnesses and operations both in New York and London, Prince Faisal did not fully assume his responsibilities till March 23, 1958. Then King Saud issued a royal decree detailing these duties. These include full power to reorganize the entire government with a view to greater efficiency in all departments.

Saud was trained for many years by his father in the administration of the interior and the dealing with the many Bedouin tribes which constitute the bulk of the population. As Crown Prince he represented his

K. S. Twitchell is a mining engineer whose services were given by the philanthropist, the late Charles R. Crane, to the former King of Yemen, Imam Yahia; and to Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, King and founder of Saudi Arabia. The services were the investigations of the natural resources which have resulted in enormous oil developments, and mining enterprises. His book, "Saudi Arabia" is considered the standard work on that country; the third and revised edition was published in 1958.

father in 1937 at the coronation of King George VI in London. He also visited most European countries. In 1947 he travelled extensively in the United States. During the first part of his visit he was the guest of President Truman; thereafter Aramco was his host. Soon after his ascension to the throne in 1953 he visited all members of the Arab League. In 1954, he visited Kuwait, Bahrein and Pakistan and the year after he went to India and Iran.

This is evidence that he knows the Arab World intimately and is known by it. In January, 1957, he was the guest of President Eisenhower. His great tact and the energetic diplomacy of the President were stretched to make up for the remarks by New York's Mayor Wagner and his orders to have no official reception for the king. This was contrary to the usual custom of the great City's welcome to important foreigners. This unfortunate gesture gave the anti-Americans in the Middle Eastern nations a very potent argument against friendship with the West. Courtesy to every class of Arab is more important and means more than to the average American. This incident was much more grave in its effects than is generally recognized and doubtless contributed materially to the present neutral attitude of Saudi Arabia.

Prince Faisal undertook many missions abroad as representative of his father. He attended the birth of the United Nations at San Francisco as chief of the Saudi delegation. He was also in charge of it during the first sessions in New York. But here there were incidents which caused him to become quite bitter and eventually to return home.

He has been Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as Viceroy of Hijaz for many years so is intimately acquainted with foreigners of all nations.

### In the Arab World

Prince Faisal and his brother Saud led the two Saudi armies which defeated the aggression of the Yemeni in 1934. Both men are highly regarded in the Arab world for their courage, their friendly intercourse with the leaders of the members of the Arab League, their resistance to dominance by any foreign power, and their adherence to the religion of

Islam. The latter includes the organization for attending to the Muslim Pilgrims who annually make the visit or "hajj" to Mecca. In 1956 the Saudi Consulate in New York reported that 275,000 people from abroad had made the pilgrimage. Before the oil concession, a major portion of the revenue for operating the Saudi Government was derived from taxes and fees paid by the pilgrims but for the past several years these have been abolished. Naturally this act has enhanced the prestige of Saudi Arabia in the Muslim world. Numbering some 300 million souls, this is a widespread influence.

The statement was made by Prime Minister Prince Faisal on April 18, 1958, in Riyadh that his country will *not* join any Arab bloc but that it "aims to be friends with every state that has no aggressive intention towards us." This indicates that the independent attitude of the Saudi government will continue. This policy has increased its prestige among the Middle East nations.

### Attitude towards Britain and France

Britain has always—until the invasion of Egypt—been respected though not loved by the Saudis. Back in 1932 King Abdul Aziz requested the author to endeavor to find American capital to help him develop mines, oil and roads. He specified "American" because he said that there was no fear of United States interference with his country's policies. He had seen how the British Empire was formed, with its pioneers protected. Subsequently the countries in which they traded were made British colonies. The United States, he said, was too distant to be feared. It was because of this feeling that the first oil concession was granted to the Standard Oil Company of California in spite of competition from British oil interests.

There have been British shipping, banking and trading firms in Jiddah for many years. Britons individually have been welcomed, liked and respected. Various members of the British diplomatic corps have been close friends of the royal family as well as of Saudi officials and leading families. H. St. J. Philby is an Englishman who was for many years a guest of King Ibn Saud and has written many histories, travels and other books regarding this country. He contributed to the first accurate maps.

The present dispute over the oasis of Buraimi and its occupation by British-led troops has further lessened the friendliness toward Britain. This was augmented by the fact that as arbitration proceedings were nearly ready for final decision, the British representative, Sir Reader Bullard, walked out and left the arbitration in abeyance. The owning and operating of the Suez Canal by the French and British was another factor in the unpopularity of these countries in the Near East.

Prince Faisal declared in his statement of April 18, 1958, that he is willing to resume diplomatic relations with Britain and France if the former will reach an agreement regarding the Buraimi Oasis and if the latter will settle the Algerian situation. Diplomatic relations were broken off in November, 1956, when Britain, France, and Israel invaded Egypt.

#### Attitude towards the United States

Relations with the United States began in a most unusual manner. Charles R. Crane was formerly Ambassador to China and prior to that a member of the King-Crane Commission appointed by President Wilson in 1919 to study the Syrian-Palestinian situation. He became so interested in the Arabs, first in Yemen, then in Saudi Arabia, that he gave the services of the author to King Ibn Saud in 1931. This was in response to the request by the king for assistance in the development of sorely needed water supplies for his country, especially Hijaz.

The initial report discouraged hopes for new and large water resources. The Finance Minister, Sheikh Abdulla Suleiman, was the king's representative at the meeting at Jiddah after the submission of the water report. He enquired as to how to increase the revenues of his government as it was now dependent on income from pilgrims and these were becoming fewer on account of the depression. When the author stated there might be mines and oil, this suggestion was welcomed and a full report was sent to his Majesty. The results were the present tremendous operations of ARAMCO with the huge income to the Government from its share. This income supports the economy of the whole country and naturally has given

the United States a place of friendship and prestige not enjoyed by any other nation.

An additional source of friendship was the formation—as the king had requested—of a mining enterprise. This was called the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate Ltd. Formed in London but with American management its shares were approximately 25 per cent American, 25 per cent Saudi Arabian, 25 per cent British and 25 per cent Canadian. These operations lasted 17 years until 1954, and produced approximately \$32 million worth of gold, silver and copper. Between 800 and 1,000 Saudi Arabs were employed during this period. This is infinitesimal compared with the oil operations, but it also contributed to friendship for the United States.

In 1957, the Saudi Arabs employed by ARAMCO numbered 12,729. Every month the company gave job training to 1,000 employees. It also is giving many opportunities for higher education. In 1957, 60 scholarships were provided for work at college and university level. Twenty Saudi Arabs were selected for the 1957 scholarships—ten were enrolled at the American University of Beirut and ten at Cairo University. In 1958, 20 more were awarded and in 1959 another 20, thereafter a total of 60 annually will be maintained. This educational program plus the 50-50 sharing of profits gives the United States a place by itself in the minds of Saudi Arabs.

#### Influence of Oil

The entire economic structure of Saudi Arabia is based on its income from oil royalties, participation and taxes. But ARAMCO has been most meticulous in not interfering in the politics of the country. Indirectly it is logical that some of the Saudi employees after graduating from the Company and its schools may enter government service as officials. They may have certain influence in various government departments. The heads of ARAMCO have always been ready to help with advice of all sorts when so requested by the Saudi Government, but only when that advice is sought. Material financial loans have been made by the oil company (also by the mining company) but no pressures of any kind have been exerted by the doing of favors.



Saudi Arabia is probably the most devout of all Muslim countries. It was founded and defended by the Ikhwan soldiers who were gathered together by King Abdul Aziz. They have supported him and his successors ever since. Their loyalties have been maintained by subsidies annually from Riyadh. There is an extremely powerful body of religious leaders called the "Ulema." King Abdul Aziz and King Saud have consulted them on major policies.

To realize how prevalent and deep-seated is their religion one must see long lines in great groups of the Saudis at their prayers five times daily—beginning just before sunrise. Much of their conversation is about religion. With such a foundation for their daily living the doctrine of the Communists saying there is no Allah, God, finds little acceptance. Although there is still poverty in the country even the poorest live in their religion.

There are two great divisions in Islam, Sunis and Sheas, similar to the Protestants and Roman Catholics. There are subdivisions but Muslims of all sects unite in making the pilgrimage to Mecca once in their lifetime if financially and physically able. If not, then it is permissible to send a proxy. As long as communism preaches a godless theory, it will make little progress in Saudi Arabia—or in most Islamic countries.

#### Leadership of Nasser

Although recently Prince Faisal was a guest of President Nasser in Cairo, this does not mean that he was seeking Nasser's leadership. He was returning a call made sometime previously. Undoubtedly he discussed the strengthening of the Arab League but not membership in the United Arab Republic.

Nasser is the hero of much of the Arab world because he expelled Britain from Egypt and then seized and operated the Suez Canal. The actions of the United States in first undertaking to assist in the construction of the Aswan Dam and then abruptly cancelling the proposed aid was deeply resented in Egypt and to an extent in the Arab world. The United States formerly was loved and respected for honoring its obligations. The delay by the United States in furnishing arms requested by Egypt was another deterrent to

friendship. It led Nasser to take aid from Russia but did not mean that he was pro-Communist. However, Nasser is in a dangerous situation. It is one which Prince Faisal would not wish to share. Nasser has been extremely clever in furthering the employment of hundreds of Egyptians as teachers in schools in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, Kuwait and Iraq. Their teachings cannot help but to extend the reputation of Nasser—perhaps to the detriment of the rulers of these states. It is only natural that Nasser would want some share in the oil riches of the Persian Gulf nations. It cannot be conceived that Prince Faisal and his people would accept any proposal by Nasser that might lead to this. As a generality it could be said that Egyptians consider themselves superior to Saudi Arabs and that this attitude is deeply resented.

#### Responsibility of Israel

It can be stated categorically that the present unrest in the Middle East stems from the establishment of the Zionist state of Israel. The opposition of the Arab nations is not religious for Muslims hold that the three great monotheistic faiths are Islam, Christianity and Judaism. The trouble is the imposition of nearly one million foreigners in an area of 8,048 square miles, driving out practically all the indigenous Arab inhabitants. Only 10 per cent of the present population is Arab but there are practically one million refugees existing around the borders, largely in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. A certain number have gone to Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Aden, Kuwait and abroad where they can find work. These are a small percentage of the total number of refugees. King Saud and his government have contributed considerable sums for the relief of the refugees and employ an appreciable number in various positions.

For many centuries the Arabs and Jews lived harmoniously in Palestine. Jerusalem is considered one of the holy cities of Islam as well as of Christendom and Judea. Only when the Zionists commenced in 1918 to make material encroachments did trouble commence.

King Abdul was always intensely concerned with the Palestine situation. On May 31, 1943, "Life Magazine" published his

views as reported from an interview in Riyadh. He stated that he knew nothing that justified Jewish claims to Palestine as their homeland for the Jews had not ruled there since the Roman period. The Arabs had ruled for 1300 years. He said there were many places in Europe, and America more fertile and spacious where the Jews could settle without conflict. Always just, Abdul Aziz went on to propose that the Arabs guarantee—with the support of the Allies—the interests of the Jews native to Palestine. King Saud and Prince Faisal continue to be vitally interested in Palestine and thoroughly agree with the attitude of their father.

The recognition of the State of Israel by President Truman was deeply resented by Saudi Arabia and all the Arab League states. They still firmly believe that the United States is largely responsible for the existence

of Israel. Border clashes have kept alive and agitated the hate of the Zionists by their surrounding neighbors including Saudi Arabia. The murder of 43 Israeli Arabs by eight Zionist border police at the village of Kafr Kasim created additional resentment. It is, however, some satisfaction to read in *The New York Times* of October 13, 1958, that these police were tried and found guilty. The sentences are not yet pronounced but the maximum penalty according to Israeli law would be life imprisonment. If such penalties are inflicted there should be some improvement in Arab-Israeli relations. If a real move towards reasonable payment of compensations to dispossessed Arab landholders were made, a further improvement might follow, but to date little has been done to mitigate the hatred felt by Saudi Arabia and the Arab world.

---

"Recent history has shown only too clearly that the systematic appeasement of dictators leads to the most harrowing experiences. Such a lesson must not be lost. We must therefore pursue our military effort, for although it imposes a heavy, costly burden on us, it is essential, not as a means of intimidation, but as a guarantee against threats and blackmail.

"But, above all, before we decide what action to take, we must assess the magnitude of the challenge thrown out to us.

"It must be clearly understood that the challenge is not that of the U.S.S.R. to the United States. It is the challenge of the whole Communist world to the whole free world and the countries of the free world must accept the challenge collectively, in all fields and everywhere. That is their only chance of winning.

"The concept of a military Atlantic Alliance restricted to a specific geographical area, adequate in 1949, is therefore no longer so in 1958.

"A common policy, probably of world-wide scope, must be added to it. And this must be done at once.

"Another thing which should be done as quickly as possible is the organization of scientific cooperation, and even economic and social action should be harmonized.

"In a word, the Atlantic Alliance should become the Atlantic Community.

"... Nato, however, must remain a powerful military machine, and it is our duty, and not always an easy one, to explain why the effort needed for this must be made.

"But even today, Nato is a great deal more than this. It is the very centre of the most significant diplomatic innovation ever attempted, and is not only creating new methods, but even a new spirit. . . .

"If the experiment in progress is crowned with success, the West will present a very different appearance, for the individualism, the national selfishness perhaps wholly admirable in the past but which are out of harmony with our own times will make way for new concepts: agreement, mutual aid, cooperation, the common good."

—Paul Henry Spaak, *Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, *Is Nato Outdated?*, September 17, 1958.

*Will Lebanon have a "breathing spell," before it is forced to digest "radical constitutional and electoral changes"? This specialist describes the problems facing Lebanon and the reasons for its resistance to "a genuinely integrated Arab federation."*

# The Dynamics of Lebanese Nationalism

By MAURICE HARARI

*Assistant to the Director, School of International Relations, Columbia University*

THE key to the paradoxes of Lebanese political behavior should probably be traced to the simple and perhaps surprising thesis that Lebanese nationalism is in essence opposed to the larger current of Arab nationalism rocking the Middle East.

When first confronted with such a view, the loyal Lebanese protests. His consistently outspoken solidarity for the Arab world does not allow him to accept a conflict between the nationalism of his country and the ideal of Arab unity. Yet he knows very well that the religio-political make-up of his country is such that the resistance to joining a genuinely integrated Arab federation will be immensely greater in Lebanon than in any other Arab country. What then of the character of Lebanese society and government which make Lebanon and its nationalism so very unique in the Middle East?

Lebanon has a unicameral legislature, the 44 seats in the Chamber being distributed on a confessional basis: 13 Maronites, 9 Sunnis, 8 Shi'is, 5 Greek Orthodox, 3 Druzes, 3

Greek Catholics, 2 Armenian Orthodox, and 1 for a group of several smaller minorities. The number of seats has fluctuated, the size of the Chamber being reduced from 77 to 44 by the new Electoral Law of November, 1952, which also, incidentally, granted Lebanese women the vote for the first time. But ever since the really independent constitutional life of Lebanon began to operate after the withdrawal of French troops in 1946, the country developed a parliamentary democracy based on the delicate projection within the legislature of the religio-political forces existing within the nation.

By consent, not inscribed in the Constitution or Electoral Law, the President of the Lebanese Republic is a Christian Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and with one solitary exception, the President of the Chamber has always been a Shi'i Muslim. Under this confessional representation, the government has insured and maintained a certain degree of internal stability. But this is at best a temporary solution to a very complex problem.

The Christians of Lebanon are resisting the taking of another population census in order to preserve the slight majority which they have maintained, at least on record, over the Muslim groups in recent years. The higher birth rate of the latter and the emigration of a number of Lebanese Christians to the United States and elsewhere are factors working steadily in favor of those who hope for a dominant Muslim majority in Lebanon. In the meantime, the Christian groups are clinging to the last official statistics, to their majority representation in the Chamber of

Maurice Harari has lived and travelled extensively in the Middle East. His most recent visit to the area was in 1956-1957 as a recipient of a Ford Foundation Travel and Research Fellowship. He received his Ph.D. in International Relations from Columbia University where he is currently lecturing at the School of International Affairs and the Near and Middle East Institute.

Deputies, and to the Maronite character of the President of the Republic.

### Precarious Balance

In this fashion, this tiny country—half the size of New Jersey—of about a million and a half inhabitants has met its constitutional and electoral challenge. The system obviously represents a delicate compromise. Political equilibrium is achieved by mutual consent and is functionally acceptable—for lack of a better system—to the amalgam of minorities making up Lebanese society. Even the selection of ministers to serve in the Cabinet has been traditionally governed by religious as well as regional considerations. The Cabinet itself is another miniature projection of the delicate equilibrium which Lebanese society seemed to demand as a guarantee against the permanent anxiety of seeing a special segment of the nation taking over the controls of government.

This does not mean that the various religio-political groupings in Lebanon are content with the *status quo*. A number of Lebanese Muslims were strongly in favor of the idea of union with Syria or with the larger Arab combination of Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Palestine. The Christians as a whole, and the Maronites in particular, have always felt threatened by the danger inherent in the fusion of Lebanon with one or more neighboring countries since this would inevitably result in a dominant Muslim majority. Almost all Lebanese consider themselves Arabs, good Arabs, loyal Arabs. Yet, their confessionalism, which ranks high in their conscious and unconscious scale of values, has seriously impeded the development of a strong and genuine Lebanese nationalism. The latter can obviously flourish only if the various local parochialisms are played down to a minimum and if the political parties within the country grapple more with ideological issues and the concrete functions of government in the Lebanese state and indulge less in feuds among personalities and clans.

Lebanese nationalism is really an aggregate of attitudes, none of which is sufficiently strong to dominate the scene and give Lebanon a purposeful and dynamic nationalism capable of sustained concentration on programs of social and economic reform. The

two strongest features of Lebanese nationalism have been negative: anti-colonialism focusing on the withdrawal of French influence from the Levant and consistent opposition to the State of Israel. The first feature lost momentum after the withdrawal of French troops from Lebanon in 1946 but gained impetus with the unfolding of the Algerian tragedy. This force combined with the opposition to Israel to provide an adequate layer of Arab solidarity but is far from sufficient to push Lebanon into an Arab federation.

The Lebanese is proud to be a Lebanese. He is also proud to be an Arab, and sees no conflict in being both at the same time. No dilemma exists for him so long as some major event does not upset this otherwise harmonious and abstract outlook. Nasserism has provided precisely that kind of a disruptive development, compelling the Lebanese nation to search its soul, examine its loyalties, and decide for or against affiliation with a major segment of the Arab world.

For many Lebanese this conflict confronting them was easy to solve, they were able to take sides and not necessarily on religious lines. For others it was a sharp and cruel dilemma. Nasser's Arab unity movement had in fact forced the individual Lebanese to take a less equivocal position on a number of nationalist and Arab issues and to give up the happy and neutral ambivalence to which Lebanese temperament is so ideally suited. This country of gifted entrepreneurs and commercial middle-men was rudely awakened by the vibrating calls for Arab unity and anti-imperialism radiating from Cairo.

### Nationalism Linked With Islam

The conflict of priorities in the Lebanese hierarchy of loyalties was further aggravated by the special brand of Arab nationalism peculiar to Nasser that emerges in his *Philosophy of the Revolution*. A number of Lebanese Muslims are whole-heartedly for Arab unity, but not necessarily on Nasser's terms—diffuse as these may be. For the non-Muslim Lebanese, Nasser's first and second circles—the Arab and African—are acceptable ideals with some reservations. But the emphasis on "Islam" in Nasser's third circle is plainly disquieting. Some are even pro-



foundly impressed by the belief often reiterated that Arab nationalism to survive must of necessity rest on a Muslim base.

In actual fact, the non-Muslim population of Lebanon does not really know how it will fare under any system where Islam is dominant. The tradition of tolerance within Islam and the experience of the independent religious millets within the Ottoman Empire are not sufficient to alleviate fear. In the absence of a certainty that their religious as well as political rights will not be curtailed, the non-Muslim population tends to resist a change in the political *status quo*.

In a more mature political democracy, would-be minorities would have been much less fearful of a change in the structure of the legislature and the executive entailing the complete rejecting of a confessional system of representation such as the one existing in Lebanon. But despite its relatively good record, Lebanon represents much too young a political experience in democratic government to inspire the requisite degree of confidence on the part of those who feel that they might be placing in jeopardy rights too precious to part with.

Lebanon's democratic experience is brief indeed if we recall that the country was under a French mandatary regime during most of the period between the two World Wars and that French troops were only withdrawn at the end of World War II. The first Lebanese experience in "independent" constitutional government began with Bishara al-Khuri who ruled as President from September, 1943, to September, 1952. But the initial part of this period was marred by French interference. As to the years beyond 1946, when Bishara al-Khuri had a free hand at the helm, many view his regime as one of increased corruption, nepotism, and inept administration. President al-Khuri finally had to resign in September, 1952, when confronted with a general strike and his own inability to find an acceptable Sunni Muslim to serve as Premier. It was probably because of General Chehab's restraint and eagerness to avoid bloodshed that a civil war was averted in those crucial weeks of the summer of 1952 and that the change-over took place constitutionally.

Although Camille Chamoun, who was then elected President, did not go so far as his predecessor in antagonizing the deputies, the press, and the country, his pro-Western orientation was bound to become more and more unpopular in a sea of rising Arab nationalism. In addition, Chamoun succeeded in alienating—much more than normal political differences justified—such key leaders as Hamid Franjiya and his Maronite supporters, Rashid Karami, the current Sunni Premier, and Kamal Djumblat, the powerful leader of the Druzes.

In the summer of 1958, the opposition elements in Lebanon, the personal antagonists of Camille Chamoun and the impact of Nasser's radio and propaganda campaign conspired to make the reelection of Chamoun for another term of six years an increasingly more explosive issue. The acceptance by Lebanon of the Eisenhower Doctrine enunciated in January, 1957, had contributed further to the popular identification of the Chamoun administration and Lebanese Foreign Minister, Charles Malik, as Western prototypes. Pro-Nasser elements in Lebanon went as far as to label Chamoun and Malik traitors to the cause of Lebanese independence and Arab unity. But how neutral was Lebanon before the recent crisis?

#### Lebanese Neutrality

Lebanon has behaved in every way as an Arab state. It was a founding member of the Arab League in 1945, it never wavered in its opposition to the State of Israel, before and after its creation, and was a signatory to the Inter-Arab Joint Defence Alliance in 1950. It supported Egypt against Britain in the United Nations and elsewhere during the tense Anglo-Egyptian negotiations started in 1947 over the thorny question of revising the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. Lebanon again stood staunchly by Egypt during and after the attack on the latter by Israel, France and Britain in 1956.

Yet, less than two years later, Egypt and Syria were being accused of malicious infiltration and interference in internal Lebanese affairs. Relations with Syria had actually been deteriorating steadily with the latter's closer identification with the U.S.S.R. and the spasmodic Lebanese fear of an internal Communist-inspired coup in Syria.

Lebanon's brand of neutrality since World War II was distinctly pro-Western but only up to a point. Despite its very cordial relations with the United States, Lebanon advised Egypt against joining the proposed Middle East Defense Organization in late 1951. Lebanon did not join the Baghdad Pact though it was not necessarily displeased by its creation. Lebanese sympathies were markedly with the West as contrasted with the Communist bloc, but the accent in Lebanese foreign policy, except *vis-à-vis* the Arab world, has consistently been on "independence" rather than on alliances, especially military ones.

### Role of Peacemaker

Within the Arab world, Lebanon has viewed its role as that of a peacemaker between the various Arab factions. The creation of the short-lived Arab union of Iraq and Jordan in February, 1958, was certainly welcome in Lebanon as a balancing force to the United Arab Republic, although the Lebanese official attitude was one of neutrality toward both Arab unions. As 1958 drew to a close, substantial segments of Lebanese society were rejoicing at the non-federation of the new Republic of Iraq or of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with Nasser's United Arab Republic. Some were further gratified to hear another Arab leader, President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, denounce Nasser and his tactics.

When in February, 1958, President Chamoun pointedly stated that he did not wish to have leaders of other Arab countries meddle in the affairs of Lebanon, Sa'ib Salem, the leader of the opposition, countered that Colonel Nasser had told him that he would not interfere in Lebanese affairs but that Lebanon should join the United Arab Republic in order to protect its independence. As tension between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic mounted, Lebanon accused Nasser of infiltrating arms and agents across the Syrian frontier and submitted the case to the Arab League as well as to the United Nations. The latter move represented a serious crack in the Arab solidarity wall especially in so far as it pitted in an international forum a member of the Arab family openly against another member of the same family. Indicative of Lebanese

fear of a pro-Nasser coup in Beirut were the continuous consultations then held by Lebanese officials with the American, French and British ambassadors. It was the Iraqi *coup d'état* of July 14, 1958, that precipitated the intervention of the United States and the landing of United States marines in Lebanon at the request of President Chamoun.

### Friendship with the West

Lebanon has received substantial economic and military aid from the United States and from Britain. It is as friendly to European powers as its brand of neutrality and the French war in Algeria will permit. United States relations with Lebanon have been unusually good. This is largely due to our genuine interest in Lebanon as symbolized by that remarkable educational center of international understanding—the American University of Beirut—and to our common interest in opposing the expansion of Communist influence in the Middle East and in preserving a certain degree of stability in the area. In the crisis confronting Lebanon in the summer of 1958, the Lebanese turned to the United States for help in the United Nations and outside it against the virulence of Nasser's attacks. French military assistance was reportedly available for the asking after the Iraqi coup but the Lebanese government preferred not to accept it—a wise decision which we probably inspired or in which we undoubtedly concurred.

It was thanks to American intervention that Lebanese stability has been restored. Although still neutral and not militarily allied to the West, Lebanon emerged from this crisis still pro-Western although Chehab's administration is evidently not—and could not afford to be—so pro-Western as that of his predecessor. From the point of view of the United States this should not be an unwelcome development so long as Chehab's "neutralist" policies retain the right shade of opposition to communism.

It was only after the lawful election of General Chehab to succeed the controversial Chamoun in September, 1958, that American marines were extricated and Lebanon was declared to have returned to a state of order and stability. But is this stability of a durable character?

On November 12, 1958, the Lebanese Parliament granted, by a vote of 39 to 1, emergency powers to Premier Rashid Karami's government allowing it to rule by decree for the following six months. Once more a spirit of compromise and confidence seemed on the surface to have pervaded Lebanese politics and it augured well for the future. Yet one cannot fail to realize that this is not a solution in depth to the basic problems confronting the Lebanese political state.

### Equilibrium and Compromise

A religio-political equilibrium has again been attained, but the threatening disruptive elements within the political system have not been eliminated. The confessional political balance of power is praiseworthy in that it provides a system—even though negative—of checks and balances that preserves the democratic form of the Lebanese government. This is probably the main reason why Lebanon has not experienced the kind of military *coup d'état* which has become the disconcerting pattern in several countries of Asia in recent years. Yet, while serving as a constitutional brake against the establishment of a military dictatorship, the confessional representation system is not one

that lends itself to the healthy growth of democratic political institutions.

Unfortunately for the moderate and peaceful Lebanese, the balance of political power within their state cannot be indefinitely preserved. The pressing demands of certain segments within the country for revision and reform, the changing religious character of the population, and the tremors of the various brands of Arab nationalism impinging on an already delicate political equilibrium, are all factors likely to precipitate another crisis.

It is only to be hoped that this crisis will not occur before Lebanon has a number of peaceful years of democratic government so essential to preparing the country for the radical constitutional and electoral changes which it will inevitably have to digest in the not too distant future. The Lebanese have displayed a real genius for compromise. But the crucial question remains to be answered as to whether the pulsations of Arab-unity-nationalism and the conflict of interests of the Communist bloc and the West over the Middle East will allow Lebanon the breathing spell that it desperately needs to strengthen the social and economic bases of its political institutions.

---

"The Soviet threat quickened our attention, hardened our resolution, speeded up our decision-making process, and increased our appropriations for military defense and foreign aid. But the extraordinary change in the content of our 'international relations' was more the product of our own progress than that of the Soviets. The time of deep American intervention in other people's affairs was bound to come. It was not hard to predict that a nation producing half of the world's industrial goods, with only 6 per cent of the world's population, would sooner or later leave its cocoon for good.

"And so we Americans, spurred by our own strength and goaded by the competition, moved cautiously out into a world in which the distinction between 'international' and 'internal' affairs was increasingly blurred. For the first time in our history, Americans are going abroad in greater numbers than strangers are coming to our shores. One per cent of our expanded American population now lives and works abroad—1,650,000 Americans, roughly a million uniformed members of the armed forces and another two-thirds of a million American civilians working for government, business, or voluntary and religious organizations—or just living abroad because they like it better. Another 1,500,000 are expected to travel abroad on shorter trips this year."

—Harlan Cleveland, *Dean of the Maxwell Graduate School, Syracuse University, Can't We Bypass the Cold War?*, July 3, 1958.

*"It is important that Americans know some of Iran's problems," states this author. "... Because of its position between Russia and the West, Iranian nationalism has to live with certain contradictions—never a safe or easy policy in the Middle East, where blacks and whites are so popular."*

# Currents in Iranian Nationalism

By ROBERT J. PRANGER

*Research Assistant, Department of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley*

**P**OLITICS and political symbols have always been effective means of creating social stability and consensus. And no symbolization has been more elaborate than that of the nation-state. Common bonds of language, history and culture may be exploited and manipulated by leadership in a society to effect some sort of unity, in order to release latent energies which produce unique drama on the world stage. Nationalism is the highest form of political art or symbol-making; it is doubtful whether beyond this politics is creative at all. But nationalism is also extreme megalomania, easily converted into frightening paranoia.

Once a nationality has "found itself," it is probable that its strident, emotionally-laden nationalism will subside. Sometimes a people must pass through Dantesque self-realization before calm is achieved; modern Germany is an example of this. But generally, throughout today's Western world, there is less highly vocal nationalism than at the turn of the century. Europe is disenchanted and exhausted after the bloody and cold-steel days of the 1920's and 1930's. "Sovereignty" is meaningless for much modern political theory and social science; talk of European federation, reminiscent of the socialist, Pierre Proudhon, is common. But the West's childhood orgies have not

been forgotten: they are mimed today by non-Western cultures seeking their own national identities and places in the twentieth century.

## **Iranian Nationalism: Background**

This article will concern itself almost exclusively with contemporary Iran. But some background is necessary. There are actually four nationalisms in the Middle East: Arab, Turkish, Israeli and Iranian. The Arab and Israeli varieties have important present-day implications for world peace, but Iranian national feeling is the most deep-rooted of the four.

Nationalism, whatever the particular label, is a state of mind more than anything else. There are certain objective stimuli which create a particular and similar subjective response in masses of people. National "feeling," therefore, subsumes both objective and subjective factors. Objectively, a "nation" has a common language, culture and historical experience. Iran can lay claim to these and to secondary elements which might include a common ethnic origin, geographical ties, religious bonds, and common interests.

In addition, individuals must have a subjective sense of belonging to this national group; that is, they must somehow identify themselves with others in a common nationalist experience. Persian history has always been dominated by Persians, even when alien groups, such as Arabs, ostensibly ruled the administrative processes. Modern educated Iranians, heirs to this truly great Persian heritage, are highly self-conscious of their common lingual, cultural and historical experience. Xenophobia, always a sure sign of real or imagined cultural inferiorities, is

Robert J. Pranger specializes in political theory and comparative government. During the summer of 1958, he worked at the Brookings Institute in Washington, D.C., on research in American government and politics.



much less common in Iran than in the Arab world; Mossadegh was the exception rather than the rule.

The "positive nationalism" of Iran's present ruler, Shah Muhammed Reza Pahlavi, gains its immediate inspiration from the impact of Russian and Western imperialism on Persian national consciousness during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Out of this contact grew the writings of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, the Persian constitutionalist movement, and the wholesale reforms of the late Reza Shah, all taking place during the first half of the present century. But the taproots of modern Iranian nationalism go much deeper into a rich cultural past.

This discussion will deal with Iran in 1958. Iranians are close to out-and-out identification with the West, yet their geographical immediacy to the U.S.S.R. and Arab nationalism have forced them to equivocate in the Cold War. Iranian nationalism is freighted with paradoxes: Iran is a member of the Baghdad Pact and a "good neighbor" of the Soviet Union; its official circles are antagonistic to Arab violence, but its mobs have been inflamed by both Muhammed Mossadegh and the Shah; it is a leader in a Western-oriented military alliance, but also the prime mover in an Aryan Confederation and made up of substantially the same powers, apparently unidentified with either London or Washington; it cooperates with Western oil companies, but is officially (and unofficially) dissatisfied with the terms of agreement; its culture is highly developed and aristocratic, but rests on a great mass of illiterate and poverty-stricken people who are becoming increasingly susceptible to propagandist appeals against the *ancien régime*. The rest of this discussion will explore these paradoxes in light of: (1) Iran's relations with the West; (2) her participation in the Baghdad Pact; (3) her fear of the U.S.S.R.; (4) her attitude toward President Gamal Abdel Nasser's form of Arab nationalism.

### Iran's Relations with the West

Iran's relationships with the West take place on four inter-connected levels: (1) the United Nations; (2) the Baghdad Pact, where Iranian politics mix with those of

Great Britain and the United States along multilateral lines; (3) relations with the United States (and other nations) on a bilateral basis; (4) commercial agreements with Western oil companies and other business concerns. Baghdad Pact problems will be considered in the next section; here we shall deal with the last two levels.

Presenting his credentials as United States Ambassador to Iran on July 21, 1958, Edward Thompson Wailes called Iran a "valued ally." There had never been any previous official reference to the United States and Iran as "allies." On July 28, the United States virtually joined the Baghdad Pact in a London declaration with Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Great Britain. The five nations stated:

Consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the high contracting parties will cooperate for their security and defense. Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this cooperation may form the subject of special agreements with each other.

At the same meeting United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles pledged aid to Pact nations, even at "great risk" to the United States, in order to maintain their independence and integrity.

Ambassador Wailes' statement, together with United States adherence to the Baghdad Pact, opened up the possibility of a mutual defense agreement between Iran and the United States, something never consummated in spite of the Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines. American policy in the Middle East has so far steered clear of tight bilateral alliances. In the case of Iran there are indications that this course may end, especially since the Iraqi coup of July 14, 1958. United States Defense Secretary Neil McElroy's visit to Teheran in late October, 1958, stirred rumors throughout Iran and prompted a Soviet protest against an Iranian-American pact. Washington denied that any such agreement had been signed or was being negotiated.

On August 5, 1954, an Anglo-Dutch-French-American consortium, composed of eight companies, signed an agreement with the Iranian government to resume south-western oil operations in place of the deposed Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. This

consortium acts on behalf of the National Iranian Oil Company through two operating companies in Holland. Profits are divided on a 50-50 basis in accordance with the prevailing Middle Eastern pattern.

Since then, more fields have been opened for exploration by the Iranian government, and agreements have been signed yielding substantially more than a 50-50 cut to Iran. On April 24, 1957, Italy, through its government-owned E.N.I. (*Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi*), signed an oil concessions agreement with Iran for drilling in the Qum region: 50 per cent of the net income will go to the Iranian government in royalties and taxes, 25 per cent to a company owned by Iran and operated in equal partnership with E.N.I., and 25 per cent to E.N.I. This amounts to nearly a 75-25 deal for Iran. Pan-American Petroleum, a Standard Oil of Indiana subsidiary, and Sapphire Petroleum also made somewhat similar arrangements with the Iranian government during June, 1958.

Ominously, the Shah announced on November 22 of the same year that he was not content with Iran's 50-50 oil agreements. Not only is this an ill omen for the giant Western consortium, heir to all of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company troubles, but it may indicate unrest in Iran. The representatives of "imperialism" are the oil companies; official dissatisfaction with their operations is always popular. It might also be that the Iranian government is in perplexed financial straits, as has been indicated by the constant pressure for more and more United States aid.

### Iran and the Baghdad Pact

Iran was the last power to join the Baghdad Pact. Its reluctance resulted from: (1) fear of the U.S.S.R., with which Iran had signed treaties of "guarantee and neutrality" in 1921 and 1927, and (2) the legacy of "Mossadeghism," distrust of the West. While official Teheran has steadfastly integrated itself in the Baghdad arrangement since late 1955, the combination referred to above is still present. The Soviet Union announced in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* during December, 1958, that it would consider a rumored mutual defense pact between the United

States and Iran to be in violation of the 1921 and 1927 treaties; Russia threatened reprisals under the terms of these agreements. In the absence of any public opinion studies of Iran's illiterate masses, it is hazardous to make generalizations about how much popular discontent exists against the Baghdad alliance. But most observers agree there is some, perhaps much. Mossadegh's ability to tap anti-Western sentiment in Iran might have been due, in part, to his extraordinary demagoguery. The fact remains that this xenophobic undercurrent was not exorcised by the Shah's return to power in 1953.

Iran leaned heavily on the Baghdad Pact during the Iraqi and Lebanese crises of 1958. The three Muslim members applauded President Eisenhower's decision to land troops in Lebanon, Britain's move of crack paratroopers to Amman, and the United States decision to participate actively within the Pact structure. This attitude, together with loud approval of the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957, has not gained Iran popularity in some Arab nationalist circles. And there are some Iranian intellectuals who disapprove of Iran's obviously anti-Nasser (and hence, to them, pro-Western) policies.

What the broad masses of Iran's populace think about these moves is simply not known. There is no "public" in the sense of articulated opinions within a democratic structure. Muted rumblings suddenly erupt into mob action followed by calm. Official circles may not wish to follow "public opinion," however it is manifested. Social, economic and political pressures keep lowly Iranian peasants and city dwellers subordinated. Pressures are reinforced by widespread illiteracy and ignorance. Mass communications, especially radio, may change this pattern. What direction such change will take is a matter for conjecture.

### Fear of the U.S.S.R.

While Iran consorts with the West to "maintain . . . collective security and to resist aggression, direct or indirect," it also strives to be a good neighbor with the Middle East's own "Colossus of the North." The Soviet Union, heir to Imperial Russia's tradition and the anti-imperialism of the Bol-

shevik Revolution, is an ever present source of trouble for Iran. The U.S.S.R. has always combined actual or threatened armed aggression, internal subversion and various blandishments to keep Iranian politics in ferment at all times.

The year 1958 was no different. While the two nations were signing trade, technical, and rail agreements, the leader of Iran's Communist Tudeh Party, Khosrov Ruzbeh, was executed by an Iranian firing squad. During the July Iraqi-Lebanese crises the Soviets maneuvered 24 land and air divisions in the Turkmen and Transcaucasus military districts opposite Turkey and Iran. Yet Teheran remained calm about these movements, even though many Iranians could see the flares and firings across the border. During these exercises, while the Kremlin's United Nations representatives were execrating United States-British intervention in the Middle East, the Soviet Union invited the Shah to Moscow.

On July 23 the Shah told members of the Iranian Parliament that his policy of "positive nationalism" had achieved cordial relations with both the U.S.S.R. and the West. He cited recent instances of "friendly co-operation" with the Soviets: (1) frontier and economic disputes have been satisfactorily adjusted; (2) there has been agreement over joint utilization of the Araxes and Atrek Rivers; (3) there are Iranian-Soviet plans for a joint hydroelectric and irrigation project. Late in October there was official talk of a visit by Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev to Iran before the end of the year. As already noted, however, the U.S.S.R. again rattled its saber in December statements on a rumored defense pact between Iran and the United States.

### Necessary Contradictions

Iran's geographical proximity to the U.S.S.R. and her vulnerability to Soviet subversion and blandishments have dictated an anomalous policy: Teheran has wholeheartedly participated in the Baghdad Pact, but has linked its rail net with the Soviet-European system at Julfa rail junction on the Russo-Iranian border; it has been flattered by invitations to Moscow, but has

waged vigorous, repressive war against internal Communist subversion, an ever-present danger as the 1954 army trouble proved. Generally, Iran has maintained "correct" neighborly relations with the U.S.S.R., no more and no less. Trade agreements and offers of technical assistance from the Soviet bloc are very attractive. Iran increased trade with Russia in 1956, 1957 and 1958, and signed an agreement with Czechoslovakia in 1957. On August 11, 1957, the U.S.S.R. agreed to provide Soviet technicians to assist Iran in development of irrigation and power on the Araxes and Atrek Rivers, which are as vital to both countries as are the Rio Grande and the Colorado to Mexico and the United States.

Iranian policy-makers have been forced to live with these contradictions, a task increasingly difficult in an era of bipolar power. Iran's situation makes this contradictory position absolutely necessary, but hazardous for internal peace and tranquillity. In Iran's transitional society there is a good deal of confusion, and people want decisive leadership at any price. They are impatient with subtleties of foreign policy-making and readily turn to demagogues like Mossadegh and Nasser, who supply dramatic black and white appeals.

### Iran in a Nasser-Dominated Area

Because of geographical separation and divergent histories Persian and Arab cultures have always been different. However, certain common social, economic and political problems unify the modern Middle East and provide fertile ground for the Kremlin's propaganda and Nasser's form of autocratic, republican socialism. Probably no Iranian enthusiast of "Egypt's Liberation" would want Nasser as ruler; but Nasser's issues are vital in every part of the Middle East and his solution is a very attractive alternative to Iran's *status quo*. So, ultimately, if Iran's ruling classes are to exercise any leadership in Southwest Asia, distinct from Nasser's and the Soviet Union's, they must first effect internal reforms. This means establishing a modicum of democratic consensus, well-articulated and yet satisfied with governmental policies. The present Shah is acutely aware of this.

Assuming that Iran is able to effect necessary reforms and establish some sort of popular consensus, how can it steer a unique course in Southwest Asia?

### **A Seven Point Program**

The speech of Iran's Dr. Djalal Obdoh before the United Nations on August 15, 1958, presented a sober appraisal of current Middle Eastern problems from the official Iranian point of view. He emphasized seven points: (1) "constructive" (or "positive") nationalism is heartily backed by the Iranian government; (2) "negative nationalism" (xenophobia, and so on) will be disastrous for the Middle East and the world; (3) the leaders of the area should "exert their moral influence" so that the sacred sentiments towards the promotion of welfare and prosperity of the people and "the achievement of their legitimate political aspirations" will be guaranteed; (4) Iran attaches great importance to the independence and integrity of Jordan and Lebanon; (5) some method of monitoring inflammatory radio broadcasts should be considered by the United Nations; (6) there should be "a concrete and equitable settlement of differences existing between the Arab countries and Israel"; (7) there should be prompt action to alleviate suffering of Palestinian refugees.

### **An "Aryan Confederation"**

These seven proposals will not be labeled "rational" or "statesmanlike" by some Arab nationalists; to them they are only expressions of the old regime. Realistically, for both ancient and modern reasons, Iran is unlikely to be leader of the Arab world. Teheran has turned its aspirations elsewhere—to the so-called "Aryan" world of Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. On September 27, 1958, the Shah announced that an "Aryan Confederation," embracing these four nations, was under serious consideration. He also noted that, since there are only two big powers in the world, Iran must join one side to defend its territories, therefore its adherence to the Baghdad Pact and proposed confederation. Subsequently, Afghanistan's permanent representative to the United Nations, A. R. Pazhwak, denied that

his country had any intention of joining an Aryan confederation. Thus, the major events of 1958 conspired to push Iran further into complete alignment with the West. Whether this is an independent and creative course in the Middle East is questionable; it is probably a necessary one.

### **Antagonists**

Arab nationalists, particularly those directed by President Nasser, have sensed this direction of Iranian foreign policy, and have reacted adversely. First, the recently deposed Colonel Abdul Salem Arif thundered inflammatory speeches from Baghdad during mid-1958. Using Nasserian epithets, he labeled the Iranian government "stooges" of imperialism and called for return of Mossadegh. Second, the Persian-speaking Kurdish population of Turkey, Iraq and Iran represent a problem for Teheran. Not only have they been used by the Soviet Union for internal subversion, but there are indications that Iranian Kurds may also become tools of Nasser's Arab nationalism, although the two cultures have never been close. Mullah Mastafar Barzani, Premier of the "Kurdish Peoples Republic" in Iran during 1945-1946, returned to Baghdad on October 7, 1958, after eleven years of exile in Communist countries. Soviet and Egyptian radio propaganda has been advocating Kurdish independence. Third, the Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact refrained from recognizing the el-Kassem government in Iraq until July 30. Great Britain and the United States recognized Iraq on August 1 and 2. The late recognition was used against the Baghdad powers by Nasser's propagandists in Cairo.

Iran, pressed by both communism and Arab nationalism, has sought to extricate itself by moving more closely toward the West and non-Arab Muslims in the Middle East. How well this strategy succeeds will depend on an internal stability based on widespread satisfaction with domestic policies pursued by Teheran. To be an effective voice in the Middle East, Iranian nationalism must first be able to back its pretensions with solid support and tangible achievements within its own borders.



# World Documents

## THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A FREE BERLIN

On November 27, 1958, the Soviet Union issued a statement urging the eventual unification of Germany and the evacuation of Berlin by the four powers. If at the end of a 6-month period, France, Britain and the U.S. do not agree to a change in Berlin's status, the U.S.S.R. will turn control of East Berlin over to the East German authorities, in violation of the Potsdam Agreement of 1945. The pertinent sections of this document are reprinted below:

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addresses the Government of the United States of America as one of the powers that signed the Potsdam Agreement on the urgent question of the status of Berlin.

The question of Berlin, which lies in the center of the German Democratic Republic but whose western part is severed from the German Democratic Republic as a consequence of foreign occupation, profoundly affects not only the national interests of the German people, but also the interests of all peoples wishing to establish an enduring peace in Europe. Here, in the historical capital of Germany, two worlds are in direct contact and barricades of the "cold war" exist at every step. A situation of constant friction and tension has prevailed for many years in the city, which is divided into two parts. Berlin, which witnessed the greatest triumph of the joint struggle of our countries against Fascist aggression, has now become a dangerous center of contradiction between the great powers, allies in the last war. Its role in the relations between the powers can be compared with a slow match taken to a powder barrel. Incidents arising here, even if they seem to be of local significance, in the situation of heated passions, suspicion and reciprocal apprehensions may cause a conflagration which will be difficult to put out. This is the dismal finale, reached after thirteen post-war years of the one-time joint, concerted policy of the four powers—the U.S.S.R., the United States, Great Britain and France—toward Germany.

To assess correctly the real importance of the Berlin problem confronting us today and

to determine the available possibilities for normalizing the situation in Berlin, it is necessary to recall the development of the policy of the powers, parties to the anti-Hitler coalition, toward Germany.

\* \* \*

When the peoples were celebrating victory over Hitlerite Germany, a conference was held in Potsdam between the heads of government of the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain in order to work out a joint policy toward post-war Germany. The Potsdam Agreement, to which France acceded soon after its signing, generalized the historic experience of the struggle waged by the peoples to prevent aggression by German militarism. The whole content of this agreement was directed toward creating conditions as would exclude the possibility of attack by Germany—not for the first time—on peace-loving states, toward preventing the German militarists from unleashing another world war, toward Germany having abandoned forever the mirage of a policy of conquest, firmly taking the road of peaceful development.

Expressing the will of the peoples, who made inestimable sacrifices for the sake of smashing the Hitlerite aggressors, the Governments of the four powers solemnly pledged themselves to extirpate German militarism and nazism, to prevent forever their resurgence and to take all measures to insure that Germany will never again threaten its neighbors or the maintenance of world peace. The participants in the Potsdam conference expressed their determination to prevent any Fascist and militarist activity or propaganda. They also pledged themselves to permit and

encourage all democratic political parties in Germany. With the object of destroying the economic foundations of German militarism, it was resolved to eliminate excessive concentration in the economy of Germany, represented in the form of cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopoly organizations which insured the assumption of power by fascism, the preparation and carrying out of Hitlerite aggression.

The Potsdam Agreement contained important provisions whereby Germany was to be regarded as a single economic whole during the occupation period. The agreement also envisaged the setting up of central German administrative departments.

The Council of Foreign Ministers, set up by decision of the Potsdam conference, was instructed to prepare a peace settlement for Germany.

\* \* \*

The relations of the United States, as well as of Britain and France, with the Soviet Union took a particularly sharp turn when these powers began carrying through in Germany a policy running counter to the Potsdam Agreement.

The first violation of the Potsdam Agreement was the refusal of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France to honor their commitments under the afore-said agreement concerning the transfer to the Soviet Union of the agreed amount of industrial equipment from Western Germany as partial compensation for the destruction and damage caused to the national economy of the U.S.S.R. by the aggression on the part of Hitlerite Germany.

\* \* \*

Setting about the restoration of the military-economic potential of Western Germany, the Western powers revived and strengthened the very forces that had forged the Nazi war machine.

Had the Western powers honored the Potsdam Agreement they should have prevented the restoration of the positions of the German militarists, checked revenge-seeking tendencies and not tolerated the building up by Germany of an army and an industry for the manufacture of means of annihilation. It is, however, known that the Gov-

ernments of the three powers, far from doing this, on the contrary sanctioned the setting up of a West German Army and are encouraging the arming of the Federal Republic of Germany, disregarding the commitments assumed at Potsdam. Furthermore, they included Western Germany in the North Atlantic bloc, set up behind the back of the Soviet Union and, as is clear to all, against it, and are now arming her with atomic and rocket weapons.

It is evident that the bitter lessons of the murderous war have been lost on some Western statesmen who are again dragging out the notorious Munich policy of instigating German militarism against the Soviet Union, their recent comrades in arms.

\* \* \*

The policy of the United States, Britain and France toward Western Germany has led also to a violation of the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement designed to insure Germany's unity as a peace loving and democratic state.

And when a separate state, the Federal Republic of Germany, was set up in Western Germany occupied by the troops of the three powers, Eastern Germany, where forces determined to prevent the plunge of the German people into another catastrophe assumed the leadership, had no alternative but to create, in its turn, an independent state.

Thus, two states came into being in Germany. Whereas in Western Germany, whose development was directed by the United States, Great Britain and France, a government took office whose representatives do not conceal their hatred for the Soviet Union and often openly advertise the similarity of their aspirations with the plans of the Nazi aggressors, in Eastern Germany a government was created that broke for good with Germany's aggressive past.

State and public affairs in the German Democratic Republic are regulated by a Constitution fully in keeping with the principles of the Potsdam Agreement and the finest progressive traditions of the German people. The domination of the monopolies and Junkers was abolished forever in the German Democratic Republic, nazism was extirpated and a number of other social and economic transformations were effected which pre-

vented the possibility of a revival of militarism and made the German Democratic Republic an important factor of peace in Europe.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic solemnly proclaimed that it would fulfill its commitments under the Potsdam Agreement to the letter which, by the way, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany obstinately avoids.

The inclusion of the Federal Republic of Germany into the North Atlantic bloc impelled the Soviet Union to take retaliatory measures inasmuch as the obligations binding the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France were broken by the three Western powers who united with Western Germany, and previously with Italy, against the Soviet Union, which had borne the brunt of the struggle against the Fascist aggressors. This restricted military alignment equally created a threat to other countries. Such a situation impelled the Soviet Union, like a number of other European countries that had suffered from aggression by German and Italian fascism, to establish their defensive organization, concluding for this purpose the Warsaw Treaty to which the German Democratic Republic also acceded.

There is only one conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing: The Potsdam Agreement has been grossly violated by the Western powers. It looks now like the trunk of a tree, once mighty and fruit-bearing, but now mangled and with its core cut out. The lofty aims, for which the Potsdam Agreement was concluded, have long been thrown away by the Western powers, and their practical activity in Germany is diametrically opposed to what the Potsdam Agreement provided for.

The crux of the matter is not, of course, that the social and political systems of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany are basically different. The Soviet Government considers that the settlement of the question of social structure of both German states is the concern of the Germans themselves. The Soviet Union stands for complete non-interference in the internal affairs of the German people, just as in those of any other people. But the

advance of the German Democratic Republic toward socialism has given rise to the Federal Government's ill-feeling and even utterly hostile attitude toward her, which is entirely supported and encouraged by the Nato countries and, above all, by the United States.

Prodded on by the Western powers, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is systematically fanning the "cold war" and its leaders have recurrently made statements to the effect that the Federal Republic of Germany will pursue "a policy of strength," that is, a policy of dictation to the other German state.

\* \* \*

If one is to face the truth, one should recognize that other countries, too, are far from supporting the Federal Republic of Germany Government's plans for reunifying Germany by force. And this is understandable, as the peoples, including those of France and Great Britain, are still smarting from the wounds inflicted on them by Hitler Germany.

\* \* \*

Mindful of all this, the peoples cannot, nor will they, let Germany be united in a militaristic-basis state.

There is another program before uniting Germany, one which is advocated by the German Democratic Republic.

This is a program for uniting Germany as a peace-loving and democratic state, and it cannot fail to be welcomed by the peoples. There is but one way of carrying it out.

It is through agreement and contacts between both German states and through setting up a German confederation. Without affecting the social bases of the G.D.R. [German Democratic Republic] and the F.R.G. [Federal Republic of Germany], this proposal, if implemented, would channel the efforts of their governments and parliaments into a common route of peace policy and would insure a gradual rapprochement and merger of the two German states.

The Soviet Union, as well as other countries interested in strengthening peace in Europe, is supporting the proposals of the German Democratic Republic for Germany's peaceful unification.

\* \* \*

Consequently, the policies of the United States, Great Britain and France, directed as they are toward the militarization of Western Germany and involving her in the military bloc of the Western powers, have prevented the enforcement of those provisions of the Potsdam Agreement which deal with German unity.

Of all the Allied agreements on Germany there is, in fact, only one which is complied with today. It is the agreement on what is known as the quadripartite status of Berlin.

Basing themselves on this status, the three Western powers are ruling the roost in Western Berlin, making it a sort of a state within a state, and using Western Berlin as a center from which to pursue subversive activity against the G.D.R., the Soviet Union and the other parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

The United States, Britain and France are freely communicating with Western Berlin through lines of communication passing through the territory and the airspace of the German Democratic Republic, which they do not even want to recognize.

The governments of the three powers are seeking to keep in force the long-since obsolete part of the wartime agreements which governed the occupation of Germany and which entitled them in the past to stay in Berlin.

At the same time, as stated above, the Western powers grossly violated the quadripartite agreements, including the Potsdam Agreement, which is the most concentrated expression of the obligations of the powers with respect to Germany.

Nevertheless, the other four-power agreements on the occupation of Germany, which the governments of the United States, Great Britain and France invoke in justification of their rights in Western Berlin, have been approved under the Potsdam Agreement or concluded in amplification thereof.

In other words, the three powers are demanding the preservation for their own sake of the occupation privileges based on the quadripartite agreements which they have flouted themselves.

\* \* \*

It is well known that the conventional way of ending occupation is for the parties which

were at war with each other to conclude a peace treaty offering the conquered country the conditions necessary for the normalization of its life.

The fact that Germany still has no peace treaty is, above all, the fault of the governments of the United States, Britain and France, which have never seemed to like the idea of drafting such a treaty. It is well known that the governments of the three powers reacted negatively to every approach the Soviet Government made to them regarding the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany.

At the moment, the United States, Britain and France are opposed, as follows from their notes of September 30 . . . [1958], to the latest proposals for a peaceful settlement with Germany, put forward by the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic while making no proposals of their own on this subject, just as they have made none throughout the post-war period.

\* \* \*

The result is a real vicious circle: The Government of the United States is objecting to the drafting of a German peace treaty by referring to the absence of a united German state while at the same time hampering the reunification of Germany by rejecting the only feasible opportunity of solving this problem through agreement between the two German states.

Is it not to get their privileges in Western Germany and the occupation regime in Western Berlin maintained interminably that the Western powers are sticking to this line with respect to the preparation of a peace treaty? It is becoming increasingly clear that this is just the fact.

The Soviet Government reaffirms its readiness to take part at any time in negotiations to draft a peace treaty with Germany.

However, the absence of a peace treaty can by no means be an excuse for attempting to maintain the occupation regime anywhere in Germany.

The quadripartite status of Berlin came into being because Berlin, as the capital of Germany, was to be the seat of the Control Council created to run Germany in the initial period of occupation.



This status has been scrupulously observed by the Soviet Union up till now, although the Control Council ceased to exist as early as ten years ago, and there have been two capitals in Germany.

The United States, Great Britain and France, on the other hand, have chosen to abuse in a blatant fashion their occupation rights in Berlin, using the quadripartite status of Berlin to pursue their own objective of doing harm to the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and the other Socialist countries.

At one time the agreement on the quadripartite status of Berlin was an equal agreement concluded by the four powers in the name of peaceful and democratic goals which were later to become known as the Potsdam Principles.

At that time this agreement accorded with the exigencies of the day and with the interests of all of its signatories—the U.S.S.R., the United States, Great Britain and France. Now that the Western powers have begun to arm Western Germany and turn her into an instrument of their policy spearheaded against the Soviet Union, the very essence of the Allied agreement on Berlin has vanished.

It was violated by three of its signatories who began using this agreement against the fourth signatory—the Soviet Union.

This being the situation, it would be ridiculous to expect the Soviet Union or any other self-respecting nation to pretend to ignore the changes which have taken place.

A patently absurd situation has thus arisen where the Soviet Union is supporting and maintaining, as it were, the favorable conditions for the Western powers' activity directed against the U.S.S.R. and its Warsaw Treaty allies. It is only too natural that the Soviet Union, just as the other parties to the Warsaw Treaty, cannot tolerate this state of affairs any longer. For the occupation regime in Western Berlin to continue would be tantamount to recognizing something like a privileged position of the Nato countries, for which there is, naturally, no reason whatsoever.

In view of this, the Government of the U.S.S.R. hereby notifies the Government of the United States that the Soviet Union regards as null and void the "protocol of the

agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the United Kingdom on the Occupation Zones of Germany and on the Administration of Greater Berlin," dated September 12, 1944, and the associated supplementary agreements, including the agreement on the control mechanism in Germany concluded between the Governments of the U.S.S.R., the United States, Great Britain and France on May 1, 1945, that is, the agreements which were to be effective during the first years after the surrender of Germany.

It is not difficult to see that all the Soviet Government does by this statement is to acknowledge the real state of affairs which lies in the fact that the United States, Great Britain and France have long since abandoned the essentials of the treaties and agreements concluded during the war against Hitler Germany and after her defeat.

The Soviet Government is doing no more than drawing conclusions which the Soviet Union finds to be inevitably following from the actual state of affairs. In connection with the foregoing, and also proceeding from the principle of respect for the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Government will enter into negotiations with the Government of the German Democratic Republic at an appropriate moment with a view to transferring to the German Democratic Republic the functions which the Soviet authorities exercised temporarily in virtue of the above-mentioned Allied agreements as well as in accordance with the U.S.S.R.-German Democratic Republic agreement of September 20, 1955.

The best way to solve the Berlin question would be to make a decision based on the enforcement of the Potsdam Agreement on Germany. But this is possible only in case the three Western powers should resume, in common with the U.S.S.R., a policy toward Germany which will accord with the spirit and the principles of the Potsdam Agreement.

In the present circumstances, this would mean the withdrawal of the Federal Republic of Germany from Nato with the simultaneous withdrawal of the German Democratic Republic from the Warsaw

Treaty Organization and the achievement of agreement whereby, in accordance with the principles of the Potsdam Agreement, neither of the two German states will have any armed forces in excess of those needed to maintain law and order at home and guard the frontiers.

Should the Government of the United States of America be unwilling to contribute in this way to the implementation of the basic political principles of the Allied agreements on Germany, it will have no reason, either legal or moral, for insisting on the preservation of the quadripartite status of Berlin.

There can, of course, be some ill-wishers of the Soviet Union who will try to read a striving for some annexation into the Soviet Government's position with regard to the occupation regime of Berlin. Such an interpretation would not, naturally, have anything in common with the real facts.

The Soviet Union, just as the other Socialist states, has no territorial claims.

\* \* \*

It is necessary to prevent Western Berlin being used any longer for intensified espionage, wrecking or any other subversive activities against the Socialist countries, against the German Democratic Republic, the U.S.S.R., or, to quote the leaders of the United States Government, to prevent its being used for "indirect aggression" against the Socialist camp countries.

Essentially speaking, the only interest the United States, Great Britain and France have in Western Berlin consists in using this "frontline city," as it is vociferously called in the West, as a vantage point from which to carry on hostile activity against the Socialist countries.

\* \* \*

The most correct and natural way to solve the problem would, of course, be for the western part of Berlin, virtually detached from the German Democratic Republic, to be reunited with its eastern part and for Berlin to become a single city within the state on whose land it is situated.

\* \* \*

The Soviet Government considers that upon the ending of foreign occupation, the

population of Western Berlin should be given the right to establish a way of life at its own choice. Should the inhabitants of Western Berlin desire to preserve the present way of life, based on private capitalist ownership, it is up to them to do so.

The U.S.S.R., on its part, will respect any choice the West Berliners may make.

On the strength of all these considerations, the Soviet Government finds it possible for the question of Western Berlin to be settled for the time being by making Western Berlin an independent political entity—a free city—without any state, including either of the existing German states, interfering in its life. It might be possible, in particular, to agree on the territory of the free city being demilitarized and having no armed forces on it.

The free city of Western Berlin could have its own government and could run its own economy, administrative and other affairs.

The four powers, which shared in the administration of Berlin after the war, could, just as both German states, undertake to respect the status of Western Berlin as a free city, just as it was done by the four powers, for instance, with respect to the neutral status which was adopted by the Austrian Republic.

On its part, the Soviet Government would have no objection to the United Nations also sharing, in one way or another, in observing the free-city status of Western Berlin.

It is obvious that, taking into consideration the specific position of West Berlin which lies in the territory of the German Democratic Republic and is cut off from the outside world, the question would arise of some kind of an arrangement with the German Democratic Republic concerning guarantees of unhindered communications between the free city and the outside world—both eastward and westward—with the object of the free movement of passenger and freight traffic. In its turn, West Berlin would commit itself not to tolerate on its territory hostile subversive activity directed against the German Democratic Republic or any other state. The above solution of the problem of the status of West Berlin would be an important step toward normalizing the situation in Berlin, which instead

of a hotbed of unrest and tension could become a center for contacts and cooperation between both parts of Germany in the interests of her peaceful future and the unity of the German nation.

The establishment of a status of a free city for West Berlin would make it possible to safeguard firmly the expansion of the economy of West Berlin owing to its all-sided contacts with the Eastern and Western countries, and worthy standards of life of the population of the city.

On its part, the Soviet Union declares that it will do its utmost to promote the attainment of these aims, especially by placing orders for such an amount of manufactured goods as would fully insure the stability and prosperity of the economy of the free city and also by regular systematic supplies to West Berlin of the necessary raw materials and foodstuffs on a commercial basis. Thus, the over two-million population of West Berlin, far from suffering from the abolition of the occupation regime would, on the contrary, have all possibilities for raising their living standards.

If the Government of the United States, as well as the governments of Great Britain and France, expresses its consent to examine the question of the abolition of the present occupation regime in West Berlin by setting up a free city on its territory the Soviet Government would be willing on behalf of the four powers to enter into official contact on this question with the Government of the German Democratic Republic with which it already held preliminary, unofficial consultations before the dispatch of the present note.

It should, of course, be borne in mind that the consent of the German Democratic Republic to the setting up of such an independent political organism as the free city of West Berlin within its territory would be a concession, a definite sacrifice by the German Democratic Republic for the sake of strengthening peace in Europe, for the sake of the national interests of the German people as a whole.

The Soviet Government on its part has resolved to effect measures designed to abolish the occupation regime in Berlin, guided by the desire to normalize the situation in

Berlin, in the interests of European peace, in the interests of the peaceable and independent development of Germany.

It hopes that the Government of the United States will show a proper understanding of these motives and take a realistic stand on the Berlin issue.

At the same time, the Soviet Government is ready to open negotiations with the Governments of the United States and other countries concerned on granting West Berlin the status of a demilitarized free city.

If this proposal is not acceptable to the United States Government, there is no topic left for talks on the Berlin question by the former occupying powers.

The Soviet Government strives for the necessary changes in the position of Berlin to be effected in a calm atmosphere, without haste and unnecessary friction, with maximum account of the interests of the sides concerned.

It is obvious that some time is needed for the powers that occupied Germany after the defeat of the Nazi Wehrmacht to agree on proclaiming West Berlin a free city if, of course, the Western powers take a proper interest in this proposal.

It should also be taken into consideration that the necessity may arise of talks between the city authorities of both parts of Berlin and also between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany for a settlement of issues that may arise.

In view of this, the Soviet Government proposes to make no changes in the present procedure for military traffic of the United States, Great Britain and France from West Berlin to the Federal Republic of Germany for half a year.

It regards this period as quite adequate to find a sound foundation for a solution of the problems connected with the change of the position of Berlin and to prevent the possibility of any complications if, of course, the governments of the Western Powers do not deliberately work for such complications.

During this period, the sides will have the possibility to prove by settling the Berlin issue their desire for a relaxation of international tension.

If the above period is not used for reach-

ing a relevant agreement, the Soviet Union will effect the planned measures by agreement with the German Democratic Republic.

It is envisaged that the German Democratic Republic, like any other independent state, must fully control questions concerning its space, i. e., exercise its sovereignty on land, on water and in the air.

At the same time, there will be an end to all contacts still maintained between representatives of the armed forces and other officials of the Soviet Union in Germany and corresponding representatives of the armed forces and other officials of the United States, Great Britain and France on questions pertaining to Berlin.

Voices are raised in the capitals of some Western powers claiming that these powers do not recognize the Soviet Union's decision to discard the functions of maintaining the occupation status in Berlin. How can such a question be raised? He who today speaks of nonrecognition of the steps planned by the Soviet Union obviously would like to speak not with the language of reason and well-founded arguments but the language of gross force, forgetting that the Soviet people are not affected by threats and intimidation.

If behind the words of "nonrecognition" there really lies the intention to resort to force and draw the world into a war over Berlin, the advocates of such a policy should take into consideration that they assume a very grave responsibility for all its consequences before the peoples and before history.

He who brandishes arms in connection with the situation in Berlin exposes once again his interest in maintaining the occupation regime in Berlin for aggressive purposes.

The Government of the Soviet Union would like to hope that the problem of normalizing the situation in Berlin, which life itself raises before our states as an imperative necessity, will in any case be solved in accordance with considerations of statesmanship, the interests of peace between the peoples, without any unnecessary nervous strain and aggravation of the "cold war."

Methods of blackmail and reckless threats of force are least of all opportune in solving such a problem as the Berlin issue.

Such methods will not help to settle a single question, they can only aggravate the situation to dangerpoint.

But only madmen can go to the length of unleashing another world war over the preservation of privileges of occupationists in West Berlin. If such madmen should really come to the fore, there is no doubt that straitjackets could be found for them.

If the statesmen responsible for the policy of the Western powers are guided in their approach to the Berlin question as well as other international problems, by hatred for communism, for the Socialist countries, no good will come out of this.

Neither the Soviet Union nor any other Socialist state can or is going to deny its existence precisely as Socialist states. That is why, having united in an unbreakable fraternal alliance, they firmly stand in defense of their rights and their state frontiers, acting according to the motto—one for all and all for one.

Any violation of the frontiers of the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, any aggressive actions against any member state of the Warsaw Treaty will be regarded by all its participants as an act of aggression against them all and will immediately cause appropriate retaliation.

The Soviet Government believes that it would be sensible to recognize the situation prevailing in the world and to create normal relations for co-existence between all states, to expand world trade, to build the relations between our countries on the basis of the well-known principles—mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit.

The Soviet Union, its people and Government, are sincerely striving for the restoration of good relations with the United States of America, relations based on trust which are quite feasible as shown by the experience of the joint struggle against the Hitlerite aggressors, and which in peacetime would hold out to our countries nothing but the advantages of mutually enriched spiritual and material cooperation between our peoples, and to all . . . men and women the blessing of tranquil life in conditions of an enduring peace.



## Received At Our Desk

### Recent Books on the Middle East and Africa

#### THE MIDDLE EAST IN TRANSITION.

Edited by Walter Z. Laqueur. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958. 513 pages and index with introduction, \$8.75.)

A collection of essays, with a long roster of outstanding contributors, provides a highly readable history of recent developments in the Middle East. The book is divided into two parts: "Social and Political Change" (Part I) deals with the growth of new ideas, both Western and Communist inspired. The consensus is that the social, economic and political upheaval of the countries of this area is incomplete. It is generally agreed that these nations will be unstable and will fail to advance until such transformations have been effected. Consequently, the problem facing Middle Eastern leaders is the direction and final form to be given the social, political and economic unrest in the area.

Part II, "Communism, the Soviet Union and the Middle East," discusses Communist influence in the Middle East and its appeal for Islamic peoples. Unfamiliar aspects of Middle Eastern societies are clearly depicted and the analyses of current situations are usually sound. A variety of stimulating viewpoints on the critical elements in Middle East politics is presented in this study designed for the layman and student alike.

FRENCH WEST AFRICA. BY VIRGINIA THOMPSON AND RICHARD ADLOFF. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958. Illustrated. 626 pages, bibliography and index, \$8.50.)

This handbook of French West Africa explores its historical, political and economic development as well as its social and cultural complexion. The authors discuss the problems besetting the separate regions of this French Overseas Territory

composed of Niger, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Guinea, Mauritania, and Senegal (most of which have, under the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic declared themselves in October-December, 1958, autonomous republics within the French Overseas Community.) With an understanding of the conflict between the French colonial administration and the inhabitants of the territory, the authors give a fresh insight into both the failings and high points of French overseas rule. An excellent survey of the growth of these developing states gives a forward look into the future of French West Africa within the French Community.

SINAI VICTORY. BY BRIGADIER GENERAL S. L. A. MARSHALL. Illustrated with maps and drawings by H. Garver Miller, ORO. (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1958. 280 pages, appendices and index, \$5.00.)

A military history of the Israeli "hundred-hour conquest of Egypt East of Suez—Autumn, 1956" examines Israel's military establishment and training program. The author analyzes the reasons for the amazing success and rapidity of the Israeli invasion in defiance of theories of modern warfare and logistics. "... Israel's Army is a fighting body in spirit and not a balanced aggregation of highly trained specialists. In a frontier sort of way, it looks the part. Its men are clean but not neat."

With an army that "is more civilian than soldier," the Israelis have deviated "from traditional military practice" and the outward signs of formal discipline. A friendly and casual atmosphere and a common desire to achieve their ends motivate the Israeli army: "That is the main lesson from the battle story. The phenomenal mobility of Israel's Army isn't generated out of machine power but out of the unan-

ymous acceptance and application of a fighting doctrine which of its essence becomes unifying in the hour of greatest danger."

#### TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

Edited by Philip W. Thayer with an introduction by Charles Malik. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. 350 pages and index, \$5.50.)

This volume is the outcome of a four day conference held at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, in August, 1957. Thirteen studies analyze the weight of the Middle East in the world balance of power, the economic and social structure, and critical spots such as Cyprus, Suez and Israel. In addition, the book contains the commentary accompanying each of the 13 papers. Both commentaries and papers were delivered by eminent scholars and specialists in Middle Eastern affairs who express a first-hand knowledge of the conflicts of interests in this section of the globe.

#### THE STATE OF ISRAEL. By L. F. RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1958. Illustrated. 229 pages, index and foreword, \$4.50.)

The author, Quondam Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford University, has twice visited Israel since it gained independence in 1948. In his foreword, Williams states that this study is an attempt to understand "how this little state manages to maintain itself as an independent entity," "what kind of a place it is, and what its people are trying to make it."

In recording the first decade of the State of Israel, the author carefully describes how the Israelis built a national state and a government designed to meet the needs of a diverse population—amid a bed of Arab hostility. This account of the Israeli achievement is also an excellent history of its unsolved problems which today determine Israeli politics. The West, the United Nations and the Israelis, as is pointed out herein, must share the responsibility for effecting an Arab peace settlement.

#### ARAB UNITY. By FAYEZ A. SAYEGH. (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1958. 272 pages, appendices of official documents and index, \$4.00.)

This book, according to its author, who is Counsellor of the Arab States Delegations Office, is an "examination of Arab unity . . . as both idea and reality—*hope and fulfillment*." Dating the growth of modern Arab nationalism back to the nineteenth century, the author traces the history of the Arab states' drive for independence within the larger context of the idea of Arab unity. The author gives his personal views on the political ideology and ideals embodied in his people's aspiration for unity. The differing plans and proposals for a pan-Arabic union, as envisaged by the various Middle Eastern nations, are fully discussed.

#### THE KINGDOM OF JORDAN. By Raphael Patai. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. Illustrated. 315 pages, glossary and index, \$5.00.)

This book studies the economic, political and cultural life of Jordan against the background of its history and rich traditional life. As Jordanian society is becoming modernized, its old values and institutions are being replaced by Western ideas. As progressive forces increase in rapidity, both "neologists" and conservative groups are feeling the "pangs of transition." "Thus in both camps discrepancies between the old and the new are felt, and compromises between what is regarded as ideal and what is found feasible have to be sought."

The flux and imbalance in Jordanian society is thus created by a people who are anxious for betterment in the "basic fields of education, sanitation and technology," and to absorb as many improvements as they will be given; and who are not yet emotionally prepared to give up their old ideas. The problem that the Jordanian must face is how to reconcile his old cultural values "within the new context of modern urban life."

The author has interestingly presented his material and has provided an excellent analysis of Jordanian society and culture.

## The Month in Review

### INTERNATIONAL

#### All African People's Conference

Dec. 5—The All-African People's Conference meeting in Accra elects moderate Kenyan leader Tom Mboya as Chairman.

Dec. 8—Ghana's Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah speaks to the opening session of the first All-African People's Conference and warns delegates against new forms of colonialism and imperialism on the part of non-European powers; he also calls for nonviolent solutions to Africa's difficulties.

Indonesia protests Soviet attendance at the All-African People's Conference.

Dec. 13—The Conference closes with an appeal to all Africans to boycott the Union of South Africa economically. A permanent All-African People's Conference secretariat is set up in Accra.

#### Berlin Crisis

Dec. 1—West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer meets with leaders of other political parties to formulate an alternative to the Soviet proposal for a demilitarized Berlin, which West German political groups find unacceptable.

Dec. 3—*Izvestia*, official Soviet Communist newspaper, states that a Big Four meeting on the status of Berlin cannot be linked to talks on German reunification, which is the exclusive concern of East and West Germany.

The *Volkshammer* (East German Parliament) meets and approves the Soviet proposal for a free Berlin.

Dec. 4—Speaking in San Francisco, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declares that peace and security demand keeping U.S. troops in West Berlin and in West Germany.

British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd opposes the Soviet proposal for a demilitarized Berlin but supports German unification based on free elections. Mr. Lloyd presents his three point program for unifying Germany and allaying Soviet fears: 1)

in the case of a unified Germany, the portion now known as East Germany would be left free of Western troops to serve as a buffer between Europe and the Soviet Union and Poland; 2) a control and inspection system would be set up throughout Europe to provide against surprise attack; 3) a men and arms level agreement would be created.

Dec. 7—In West Berlin's quadrennial elections for members of West Berlin's House of Representatives and of the 12 borough councils, some 95 per cent of the 1,760,000 voters cast their ballots to give a resounding victory to the democratic parties. Mayor Brandt's Social Democratic party wins a majority. With only 2 per cent of the vote going to the Communists, the election is interpreted as rejecting the Soviet proposal to end four power control of Berlin.

Dec. 10—U.S. President Eisenhower replies to Soviet proposals for a free Berlin by asserting that the Western allies are committed to their basic policy (i.e., a unified Germany based on free elections) and to maintaining freedom in West Berlin pending such unification.

Dec. 14—The foreign ministers of France, Britain and the U.S. reaffirm their rights and duties in West Berlin, reject Soviet proposals for a demilitarized Berlin, and support their "right of free access" to the city.

Dec. 15—Poland and East Germany release a statement, ending a joint conference in Warsaw, accusing West Germany of attempting to control Europe. It calls for a top-level summit conference.

Dec. 16—The Council of Ministers of the 15 Nato nations expresses support for the U.S.-British-French position on the Berlin crisis. However, the Nato nations are willing to discuss the question of Germany with the Russians.

Dec. 20—Officials report that the Western powers are willing to guarantee against possible German aggression if the Soviet

Union will agree to unifying Germany on the basis of free elections.

Dec. 28—The Social Democrats, who won a majority in the recent West Berlin elections, agree to keep a coalition government with the Christian Democrats.

Dec. 31—French, British and U.S. notes are delivered in Moscow, which urge the negotiation of a free Berlin within the framework of talks on the larger questions of German unity and European security, and reject the Soviet proposal that Allied occupation of West Berlin end by June 1, 1958. (*For further information see pages 107-114 of this issue.*)

#### Disarmament

Dec. 6—The U.S.S.R., the U.S. and Britain agree on the first article of a treaty that would ban nuclear weapons tests. The text of the article is not made public, but it is understood that it provides that all nations can sign the nuclear test ban treaty.

Dec. 8—The U.S.S.R., the U.S. and Britain agree on the second article of the nuclear test ban treaty providing for international controls to monitor a test ban. The U.S.S.R. offers a blueprint on controls which is not made public.

Dec. 12—The three powers meeting at Geneva agree on the third article of the proposed treaty, setting up a four-part framework of an international control system; powers and functions are not defined.

Dec. 15—The U.S. offers a detailed blueprint for an international control system; Russian reaction is negative.

Dec. 17—Article four of the proposed nuclear test ban treaty is approved by Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. Article four deals with the composition of a control commission with a pattern similar to that of the Security Council. The U.S., Britain and the Soviet Union would each have a permanent representative on the Control Commission; four other states would be represented for two-year periods.

Dec. 19—The conference on nuclear test bans adjourns for two weeks; meetings will be reopened January 5. Four draft treaty articles have been accepted but major differences are unresolved.

#### Conference on Surprise Attack

Dec. 2—The Soviet Union asks negotiators to discuss its inspection plan for preventing surprise attack and inspection zones at the same time.

Dec. 3—The U.S. reveals the Western plan for an elaborate network to prevent surprise attack by ballistic missiles. Among other measures are high altitude radar installations, electronic computers to calculate the course of missiles, periodic aerial inspection and mobile observer teams.

Dec. 5—Britain submits a plan for an international inspection system calling for ground control posts and aerial inspection.

Dec. 7—The U.S.S.R. publishes details of its plan providing for 54 control posts on Nato and Baghdad Pact territory, 28 stations on Warsaw Pact territory including 6 in the U.S.S.R. Also provided would be an aerial survey zone about 500 miles east and west of the boundary between West and East Europe. Reduction of foreign forces in Europe is also suggested, and it is said that no mass destruction weapons should be based in East or West Germany. The Western powers say these proposals are linked to disarmament and political questions beyond the conference's scope.

Dec. 18—The 10-nation conference on preventing surprise attack is indefinitely adjourned. The technical approach of the Western powers cannot be reconciled with the technical-military-political coordinated approach insisted on by the Eastern powers. No agenda has been set up.

#### Nato Meetings

Dec. 13—The U.S.S.R. in notes to Nato countries as the Nato meetings open suggests a nonaggression pact between Nato and Warsaw Pact nations including an agreement not to support any "aggressor," even if the "aggressor" is an ally. Reduction of overseas troops and military bases and an atom-free Central European zone are also suggested.

Dec. 15—Britain, the U.S. and France confer on the eve of Nato meetings. American-French differences continue.

Secretary General of Nato Henri Spaak says that the Berlin problem will be the



first item on the agenda at the Nato meetings. (See also *Berlin Crisis*.)

Dec. 17—U.S. General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Commander in Europe, appeals for more military strength in Europe; member states pledge to "do their best" to fulfill arms requirements.

### United Nations

Dec. 2—Britain reports to the General Assembly's Legal Committee that Iceland's coast guard vessel Thor fired live ammunition at a crippled British trawler in October during the fishery dispute.

Dec. 6—Dag Hammarskjöld suggests an international scientific conference on atomic radiation dangers.

The United Nations Administrative Tribunal upholds the dismissal of senior political officer Povl Bang-Jensen.

Dec. 12—The General Assembly adopts a resolution asking for continued aid to Palestine Arab refugees.

The General Assembly admits the former French colony of Guinea as the 82nd member of the U.N.

The General Assembly condemns the U.S.S.R. and Hungary again for repressing the Hungarian people.

Dec. 14—After failing to reach an agreement on a resolution concerning Algeria, the General Assembly recesses until February 20, when it will meet in special session to consider independence for the British and French Cameroons.

Before recessing, the General Assembly approves 53 to 9 with 19 abstentions a resolution that outer space should be used only for peaceful purposes; an 18-nation outer space study committee is to be set up, despite Russian disapproval.

### West Europe

Dec. 2—The Benelux Council of Ministers agrees that Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg will become one economic unit early in 1959.

Dec. 3—The European Economic Community agrees to extend the 10 per cent tariff reduction it plans for January 1 to all members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.).

Dec. 16—Twenty-six ministers of European nations fail to agree to eliminate dis-

crimination by the six common market nations and their neighbors in Europe. Seventeen nations agree to study British and French compromise plans.

Dec. 22—The European Atomic Energy Community's Ministerial Council approves a draft agreement providing for cooperation between Great Britain and Euratom for peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Dec. 27—Britain and nine West European governments reveal joint plans to increase the convertibility of their currencies, making sterling convertible. Nations joining in this arrangement are France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Denmark. (Also see *Great Britain*.)

Dec. 29—It is reported in Luxembourg that the devaluation of the French franc has resulted in a loss of several million dollars for the six-nation European Coal and Steel Community.

### ARGENTINA

Dec. 3—Union leaders capitulate and order railway strikers back to work after a 5-day walkout because of military pressures.

Dec. 9—Peronist trade union leaders declare the general strike, scheduled for this week, cancelled. A split among union leaders, the threat of military intervention in the strike, and new Labor Ministry promises are factors in the no-strike decision.

Dec. 29—President Arturo Frondizi devalues the peso, and announces the end of trade restrictions, thus establishing a free market.

In the largest aid program to be given any one Latin American country, the U.S., the International Monetary Fund and private banks give Argentina some \$329 million worth of assistance. In return Argentina has agreed to set up a tight economic program which will mean an immediate lowering of the standard of living.

### BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, THE

#### Australia

Dec. 6—Final figures reveal an election victory on November 22 for Prime Minister Robert G. Menzies; he will have a majority of 32 in the House of Representatives.

**Ceylon**

Dec. 1—The Ceylon Daily News reveals details of an alleged assassination plot against high officials.

**Ghana**

Dec. 20—It is announced in Accra that two important members of the United Party have been arrested and charged with planning a coup.

Dec. 22—Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah reveals that there is a possibility that Liberia may join a proposed Ghana-Guinea union.

Dec. 29—Prime Minister Nkrumah says he has not received any offer of economic or technical aid from the U.S.S.R.

**Great Britain**

Dec. 1—Canada receives from Britain the final payment on an interest-free \$700 million World War II loan.

Dec. 3—The Ministry of Education reveals plans for a program to improve schools and school buildings over a five-year period beginning in 1960 at an estimated cost of some £400 million.

Coal miners receive an unconditional retroactive wage increase of 7 shillings, 6 pence weekly (about \$1.05).

Dec. 16—Labor party spokesmen again ask for an inquiry into the Suez affair in the House of Commons.

A spokesman for the Foreign Office says that Britain's current arms transaction with Indonesia is only for aircraft and not for warships.

Dec. 18—The Oversea Migration Board publishes a report revealing that Britain will probably receive more immigrants in 1958 than it loses emigrants.

Dec. 27—Britain moves to make the pound sterling more convertible by merging American account or official sterling with transferable sterling; holders of sterling outside the dollar and sterling areas now may convert sterling for dollars at the official rate instead of at a discount. (See also under *International, West Europe*.)

Dec. 30—The Ministry of Defense reveals the appointment of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Mountbatten of Burma as Chief of the Defense Staff; the appointment takes effect in July, 1959.

**India**

Dec. 1—The treason trial of Sheik Mohammed Abdullah of Kashmir is suspended for two weeks at his request.

Dec. 21—A tunnel a mile and three-quarters long in the Northern Himalayas is opened; this makes year-round traffic possible between India and Kashmir.

**Malaya**

Dec. 3—The Federation of Malaya's Paramount Ruler, Sir Abdul Rahman, addresses the Legislative Council in Malay in his annual policy statement; this is his first address to the Council in Malay.

Dec. 4—The Federal Council approves a bill to forbid the Bank of China from operating in Malaya.

Dec. 6—Prime Minister Abdul Rahman tells the Legislative Council that it is easier to fight Communists in the jungle than to guard against their subversive policies.

**BRITISH EMPIRE, THE****Basutoland**

Dec. 18—Lord Home, British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, reports to the House of Lords that constitutional changes will be made in Basutoland providing for a legislative council, an executive council and a voting system with a single roll for Basuto and non-Basuto British subjects and protected persons. Basutoland is a High Commission Territory forming an enclave within the Union of South Africa.

**Buganda**

Dec. 15—The Lukiko (Assembly) approves unanimously a memorandum to Queen Elizabeth asking Britain to terminate the Treaty of 1894 providing British protection for Buganda. Buganda is a province of Uganda and would like independent status within the Commonwealth.

**Cyprus**

Dec. 4—Despite Greek opposition, the U.N.'s Political Committee passes a resolution urging a conference among Britain, Greece and Turkey on the Cyprus question.

Dec. 18—British, Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers meet in Paris, in secret discussions.

Dec. 24—Greek Cypriote terrorists offer a truce.

## BULGARIA

Dec. 29—It is reported over the Bulgarian radio that the U.S.S.R. has loaned some 130 million rubles for the construction of a 1 million ton oil refinery.

## BURMA

Dec. 2—General Ne Win orders the arrest of opposition politicians.

## CAMBODIA

Dec. 3—Cambodia issues a formal protest to the United Nations that Thailand has massed troops and supplies on their joint border.

## CHINA (NATIONALIST)

Dec. 9—Communist China fires some 3700 shells at Quemoy Island.

Dec. 16—Nationalist ships convoy supplies to Quemoy because the Communists fire on this offshore island on odd numbered days only.

Dec. 23—Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek tells the Mainland Recovery Planning Board that he is against revising the Chinese Nationalist Constitution to permit him to run for a third presidential term.

## CHINA (THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC)

Dec. 12—Meeting for the first time in 3 weeks, Chinese Communist and U.S. ambassadors confer in Warsaw.

Dec. 16—Foreign Minister Chen Yi announces that Mao Tse-tung will resign as Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic, but will maintain leadership of the Chinese Communist party. The Central Committee decided, reports Chen, on December 10 to approve Mao's suggestion that he relinquish the chairmanship. The Foreign Minister states that should circumstances so demand, Mao could be re-elected President of the Republic.

Dec. 18—A resolution passed by the Central Committee at its recent 10-day meeting orders a slowdown in establishing communes in large cities and improvement in the operation of the 26,000 communes in rural areas.

Dec. 24—*Jenmin Jihpao*, the Chinese Communist party newspaper, reports that army officers are to be sent to the 26,000 rural communes to assist in their reorganization and consolidation.

It is announced that farm acreage will be reduced for 1959.

Dec. 29—Communist China agrees to loan Outer Mongolia 100 million rubles for highway, electric power, and industrial development.

Dec. 31—A State Statistical Bureau report estimates that China's output for 1958, both agricultural and industrial, doubled or more than doubled output for 1957.

## COLOMBIA

Dec. 3—President Alberto Lleras Camargo reports that former dictator Lt. Gen. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla has been arrested for conspiring to overthrow the incumbent regime.

Dec. 16—It is announced that the World Bank has approved a \$2,800,000 loan for electric power development in Cali, Colombia.

## CUBA

Dec. 5—U.S. Ambassador Earl E. T. Smith returns to Washington for consultation with the U.S. State Department about the increasing problems faced by Cuban President Fulgencio Batista.

In one of the fiercest battles in the two-year old rebellion led by Fidel Castro, reports declare some 200 soldiers and some 250 rebels killed.

Dec. 7—President Batista asks Congress to declare a "state of national emergency." Constitutional guarantees are suspended by the government throughout the country for another 45 days.

Dec. 11—Manuel Urrutia Lleó, the rebels' choice for Cuban president, returns from exile to rebel territory in Oriente Province. It is believed that the rebels plan to establish their own government with Urrutia at its head.

Dec. 22—It is reported that rebel troops are trying to bring Santiago de Cuba, the country's second largest city, under their rule.

Dec. 26—It is disclosed that the U.S. and other American nations have been nego-

tiating to find some solution to Cuba's unrest.

Dec. 27—Cuban army planes, according to information received, are attacking rebel strongholds in Las Villas Province, where rebels declare they have captured 18 towns.

Dec. 30—Batista's two sons and other persons close to the Cuban president fly to New York.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Dec. 3—The Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry accuses the U.S. of violating Czech air space when conducting maneuvers along the German-Czech frontier. U.S. airplanes are charged with flying 20 miles over Czech territory.

Official economists report that Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union are the only two creditor nations in the Communist bloc. For the first 9 months of 1958 Czechoslovakia had a trade balance of \$123 million or 910 million crowns.

## FINLAND

Dec. 4—Foreign Minister Johannes Virolainen, an Agrarian party member, resigns touching off a crisis in Premier Karl-August Fagerholm's coalition Socialist government. Four other Agrarians follow Virolainen's lead and ask to resign, thus causing the collapse of the government.

Dec. 6—Finland marks her forty-first year of independence.

Dec. 10—President Urho K. Kekkonen advises the Finnish people in an unprecedented broadcast that good relations with the Soviet Union are "the over-riding question" for Finnish foreign policy.

Dec. 16—Agrarian party leader Kauno Klemola is unable to form a coalition government as the crisis nears its second week.

## FRANCE

Dec. 1—President René Coty tells Premier Charles de Gaulle he will not run for reelection.

Dec. 7—Frenchmen, in limited numbers, cast their ballots for presidential electors; the electors on December 21 will choose the first president of the Fifth Republic.

Dec. 9—Jacques Chaban-Delmas is elected permanent speaker of the National As-

sembly. In the Senate (formerly the Council of the Republic in the Fourth Republic) Gaston Monnerville is elected president for the sixteenth time.

Dec. 13—Premier de Gaulle announces his willingness to run for the presidency.

Dec. 15—U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles confers with de Gaulle in Paris. De Gaulle complains of the U.S. recognition of Guinea, and pushes his demand for a "global strategy board" composed of France, Britain and the U.S.

Dec. 18—The committee on provisional rules proposes to seat Opposition and Government deputies to the National Assembly separately for the first time.

Dec. 21—The 81,000-man electoral college elects de Gaulle first president of the Fifth Republic.

Dec. 27—The franc is devalued by 17.55 per cent. The franc is now valued at 493.7 to the dollar instead of 420. In addition the Cabinet announces other economic measures: a new franc, worth 100 of the old, will be coined; the new franc will be readily convertible, even by those outside the franc zone, into other currencies; and 75 per cent of France's foreign trade is relieved of quota restrictions.

Dec. 28—Premier Charles de Gaulle and Finance Minister Antoine Pinay tell the French people in a television-radio broadcast of the stringent financial period which they must undergo because of the franc's devaluation. Financial sacrifices will be necessary because of some \$626 million in new taxes coupled with the loss of \$345 million in subsidies which helped keep the prices of basic items low. In addition the devalued franc means higher prices will have to be paid for foreign goods.

Dec. 30—The Cabinet passes measures allowing de Gaulle the power to declare "general mobilization or a state of alert" and to requisition persons and property if nuclear or "subversive" war is threatened.

## FRENCH OVERSEAS COMMUNITY, THE

### Algeria

Dec. 3—Eight French soldiers are released by the Algerian National Liberation Army.



Dec. 7—Ending his 5-day visit to Algeria and the Sahara, Premier de Gaulle states that Algeria is not yet ready for a political solution in a rebuff to Algerian Europeans. De Gaulle's staff reveals that the Premier intends to emphasize economic reforms.

Dec. 12—Replacing General Raoul Salan in Algeria, Paul Delouvrier is given the top civil administrative post of Delegate General (answerable only to the Premier) and Air Force General Maurice Challe is given Salan's old job of commander in chief of the armed forces in Algeria. Salan himself is appointed to the newly created post of Inspector General of National Defense.

Dec. 28—As winter conditions become severe, some 80,000 Algerian refugees in north Morocco are reported desperately in need of food, clothing, and shelter.

Dec. 29—A spokesman for the Algerian Provisional Government reports that some 354 French soldiers were killed last week.

Dahomey, Ivory Coast, French Polynesia, French Sudan, Miquelon, New Caledonia, Saint Pierre, Senegal, Ubangi-Shari and Upper Volta

Dec. 1—The Territorial Assembly of Ubangi-Shari votes to join the French Community as an autonomous republic.

Dec. 4—Dahomey and the Ivory Coast become the ninth and tenth French territories to adopt the status of independent republics within the French Community.

Dec. 11—Upper Volta elects to become an independent republic within the French Community.

The territories of Comoro Islands and French Somaliland decide to retain their present status.

Dec. 16—French Polynesia, St. Pierre and Miquelon choose to retain their present status within the new French community.

**GERMANY, EAST** (see also *International, Berlin Crisis*.)

Dec. 5—The East German government announces that it is holding an American flier who parachuted from his plane into East German territory while on a flight near the Czechoslovak border.

**GERMANY, WEST** (See *International, Berlin Crisis*, and the *United Arab Republic*.)

**GUINEA** (See also *International, U.N.*)

Dec. 3—French Premier de Gaulle's office reveals that France and Guinea are working on an agreement whereby Guinea will remain within the franc zone.

**HUNGARY** (See *International, U.N.*)

**ICELAND**

Dec. 4—The coalition government of Progressive, Social Democratic and Labor Alliance parties headed by Premier Hermann Jonasson falls when the 3 parties disagree on economic problems.

**INDONESIA**

Dec. 3—The Parliament nationalizes Dutch holdings seized by the government in December, 1957.

Dec. 20—All traffic out of Sumatra is forbidden; there are reports of heavy fighting on this island.

Dec. 28—Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, on a state visit to Indonesia, says that he and President Sukarno are in agreement on their common problems.

**IRAN**

Dec. 6—*Pravda*, leading Soviet newspaper, accuses Iran of violating her neutrality agreement by accepting a military agreement with the U.S. (The U.S. State Department says that it is not negotiating a new military treaty with Iran but only seeks to reinforce "existing security arrangements," i.e., the Baghdad Pact.)

**IRAQ**

Dec. 3—It is confirmed that a cargo of Soviet supplies has landed in Iraq.

Dec. 8—A Baghdad radio broadcast declares that Premier Abdul Karim el-Kassem has foiled a plot to overthrow his regime.

Dec. 15—U.S. Assistant Secretary of State William M. Rountree, on a fact-finding tour of the Middle East, is greeted at the Baghdad airport by crowds shouting for him to go home.

Dec. 16—Rountree meets with el-Kassem as quiet returns to Baghdad.

**ISRAEL**

Dec. 4—It is reported that Israel will ask the U.N. Security Council to consider the shelling of 8 Israeli villages in the Hula Valley by Syrian soldiers.

Dec. 8—At the meeting of the Security Council to discuss Syrian border aggression against Israel, the Council hears both parties and receives the report prepared by U.N. Truce Chief Major General Carl C. von Horn of Sweden.

Dec. 15—U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld says that he will leave this week for the Middle East to try to settle the Israeli-U.A.R. crisis.

Dec. 20—Israel reports that its air force downed an U.A.R. plane flying over the Negev desert.

Dec. 29—The Israeli-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission condemns Israeli violation of Egyptian air space on December 20.

**ITALY**

Dec. 4—Christian Democrat Amintore Fanfani and his coalition government are defeated on a measure to keep a high gasoline tax by a 314-263 vote in the Chamber of Deputies. The Premier and his Cabinet, in an emergency session, agree to ask for a vote of confidence before departing for the Nato talks scheduled for mid-December.

Dec. 6—Fanfani wins his vote of confidence by a narrow margin, 294-286.

**JAPAN**

Dec. 2—On a state visit, President Carlos P. Garcia of the Philippines tells the Japanese Diet that "security" is their "mutual interest."

Dec. 4—Japan and the Soviet Union sign an agreement for a 25 per cent increase in joint trade for 1959, providing for \$35 million in purchases by both sides.

Dec. 28—Three Cabinet members resign, leaving Premier Nobusuke Kishi's government facing Socialist party demands for its dissolution and for national elections.

Dec. 30—In an attempt to heal the split within his Liberal-Democratic party, Kishi says that he will appoint men from other factions within the party other than his own to top party posts.

**JORDAN**

Dec. 1—Martial law ends in Jordan after 19 months.

**KOREA (SOUTH)**

Dec. 4—The 16 Korean war allies reject a Chinese Communist proposal for the reunification of Korea.

Dec. 8—In a joint communique, Red China and North Korea ask for the withdrawal of all U.N. forces from South Korea.

Dec. 24—With members of the Opposition locked out of South Korea's National Assembly, President Syngman Rhee's Liberal party pushes through a measure giving the government greater security power.

**LEBANON**

Dec. 3—Lebanon accepts a \$10 million loan from the U.S. to carry on a public works program.

Dec. 10—Premier Rashid Karami declares that his government is not bound to observe President Eisenhower's Middle East doctrine.

**LUXEMBOURG**

Dec. 10—The coalition government resigns when a fight occurs among Cabinet members over an attempted bribery in the Transport Ministry.

**MEXICO**

Dec. 1—Adolfo Lopez Mateos is inaugurated for a six-year presidential term. He names a Cabinet composed of moderates.

**MOROCCO**

Dec. 3—The resignation of Premier Ahmed Balafrej is accepted by King Mohamed V.

Dec. 16—Abdallah Ibrahim is asked to form a non-political government.

Dec. 29—The Moroccan franc is not to be devalued, it is announced.

**NETHERLANDS**

Dec. 11—Five Socialist ministers resign when the Parliament rejects two government tax laws, causing the government to topple.

Dec. 22—Professor Louis Beal is named Premier to replace the fallen government of Premier Willem Drees.

**PHILIPPINES (See Japan.)**

**POLAND** (See also *International, Berlin Crisis.*)

Dec. 3—First Secretary of the Polish United Workers (Communist) party, Wladyslaw Gomulka supports the Soviet plan for a free Berlin. He declares that an act of aggression against East Germany is an act against the Warsaw Pact signatories.

Dec. 6—A Polish official confirms that an oil pipeline linking Soviet fields with East Germany and Poland is planned. (See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Dec. 12—The U.S. announces that it will make available to Poland a \$20 million loan for the purchase of industrial equipment.

**RUMANIA**

Dec. 20—It is announced that last Thursday a 226-mile pipeline carrying natural gas from Rumanian fields to industrial centers within Hungary began functioning.

**SPAIN**

Dec. 23—It is announced that the Spanish parliament has approved a law allowing foreign companies to develop Spain's oil resources on a 50-50 profit basis with the Spanish government.

**SWITZERLAND**

Dec. 11—Minister of Defense Paul Chaudet is elected to the presidency for the 1959 one-year term.

**TUNISIA**

Dec. 2—It is reported that President Habib Bourguiba, in a speech last weekend, expressed the desire to buy up all foreign landholdings in his country. French farmers hold 7-8 per cent of Tunisia's arable land. The program to buy out foreign landholders was originally supposed to cover only that land along the Tunisian-Algerian frontier.

Dec. 30—Bourguiba reshuffles his Cabinet to give the post of Minister of Information to Mohamed Masmoudi, former Ambassador to Paris.

**TURKEY**

Dec. 2—The Organization for European Economic Cooperation announces that 12 European nations have extended some \$70 million in credits to Turkey, channeling

it through the O.E.E.C. West Germany alone puts up \$50 million.

**U.S.S.R., THE** (See also *International, Berlin Crisis.*)

Dec. 9—It is reported that in talks with Nikita S. Khrushchev in Moscow last week, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey was told that the Russians have an intercontinental missile with an 8,700 mile range.

General Ivan A. Serov is relieved of his post as chairman of the State Security Committee.

Dec. 14—According to the 1958-1959 edition of *Jane's Fighting Ships*, the Soviet Navy is rated second and the U.S. Navy, first.

Dec. 17—*Jane's All the World's Aircraft*, in its 49th edition, reports that the Soviet Union has in operation a new 6-jet intercontinental bomber (called the Bounder) that can fly at twice the speed of sound, some 1400-1500 miles an hour.

Dec. 18—Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan is given a visa to visit the U.S.

Dec. 19—First Deputy Premier Mikoyan tells the Poles that a pipeline from Russian oil fields to East Europe will be built. (See also *Poland.*)

It is reported that former Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin appeared before the Central Committee yesterday to confess that he had been the head of an "anti-party" group within the Soviet government and declared that he now believes in party policy.

Dec. 22—At the opening session of the Supreme Soviet, the 1959 budget, totalling some 707 billion rubles and providing for increased expenditures in the fields of science and social benefits, is presented. The government also plans to invest 308 billion rubles in industry, agriculture, communications and transportation.

Dec. 25—The head of the mass organizations section of the party's Central Committee, Aleksandr N. Shelepin, is named to succeed General Serov.

**UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC**

Dec. 14—U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser meets with U.S. Assistant Secretary

of State William M. Rountree, who is on a fact-finding tour of the area.

Dec. 23—Speaking at Port Said in commemoration of the departure of the last British-French forces from Egyptian soil in 1956, Nasser accuses the Syrian Communist party of working to undermine Syrian-Egyptian unity.

Dec. 24—The U.S. agrees to sell the U.A.R. \$24,900,000 worth of wheat. It is disclosed that the State Department is supporting possible West German participation in the construction of the Aswan High Dam.

Dec. 25—Syrian Communist leader Khalid Bakhdash and many of his supporters were arrested this week, it is reported.

Dec. 26—The Syrian Executive Council closes down the Communist daily, *Al-Nour*.

Dec. 28—The Soviet Union and the U.A.R. sign an agreement for \$100 million worth of Soviet assistance for the construction of a high dam at Aswan.

Dec. 29—West Germany, which was reported prepared to loan Egypt the equivalent of \$48 million, is reconsidering its offer following the sudden signing of the Soviet-U.A.R. agreement on the Aswan Dam.

## UNITED STATES

### Agriculture

Dec. 16—The National Agricultural Advisory Committee asks Benson to abandon the "parity" price support program; Benson agrees that this would be wise.

Dec. 17—The Department of Agriculture reports that 1958 crops reached a record high, 11 per cent more than the previous record.

Dec. 26—In a year-end summary, the Department of Agriculture reports a loss of \$1,251,000,000 to the Commodity Credit Corporation for the 16 months ending October 31, 1958, in the farm surplus disposal program.

### Civil Rights

Dec. 5—Circuit Court Judge George Wallace of Clayton, Alabama, refuses to answer a summons issued by the Civil Rights Commission asking him to surrender his voter registration records.

Dec. 8—Voter registrars in six counties of Alabama refuse to surrender voter registration records to the Civil Rights Commission.

Dec. 9—The Civil Rights Commission asks court action against the Alabama registrars who refuse to give up their registration records.

Dec. 10—President Eisenhower says that the refusal of Alabama officials to surrender voting records is "reprehensible."

### The Economy

Dec. 12—Meeting for the first time since the A and P was founded 99 years ago, stockholders approve a reorganization; voting shares will now be available to the public.

Dec. 15—The Census Bureau reports that the average American family income is now \$5,000.

Dec. 17—The American Telephone and Telegraph Company recommends a three-for-one split in stock shares and a 10 per cent dividend increase. Action will be taken by the stockholders at the annual meeting April 15.

### Foreign Policy (See also under *International, Nato and Berlin.*)

Dec. 8—Returning from Moscow, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey says that cold war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. will last "for a long time;" he does not expect open warfare for at least seven years.

Dec. 18—The State Department reveals that Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan has been given permission to visit the U.S. in January.

Dec. 21—William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, returns to Washington after his trip to the Middle East. His car has been hit with mud, stones and eggs in Baghdad but he notes that the Iraqi Government conducted "useful and friendly discussions" with him thereafter.

Dec. 31—The United States, acting concurrently with Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa, announces that these nations have adopted a common standard for the length of the inch and the weight of the pound.



### Government

Dec. 1—Horace Stern, special hearing examiner, recommends that the Federal Communication Commission should revoke its grant of television Channel 10 in Miami in the light of efforts to influence the F.C.C. in that area.

Dec. 6—The Democratic National Committee overrules Southern protests and states as a party policy that Supreme Court rulings should be enforced and made effective.

The State Department reveals that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles entered Walter Reed Army Hospital last evening for an intestinal ailment.

Dec. 9—President Eisenhower will proclaim Alaskan statehood after January 1, it is revealed by the White house.

Dec. 10—The Census Bureau reveals that 42,900,000 children were enrolled in school in the fall of 1958, a record high.

Dec. 11—The White House reveals that Vice President Richard Nixon is helping draft the President's State of the Union message.

Dec. 12—Secretary of State Dulles leaves for Paris on his sixty-second trip abroad as Secretary of State; he leaves from the hospital and is not fully recovered.

Dec. 22—Boston industrialist Bernard Goldfine is sentenced to three months in jail for criminal contempt of a federal court, in Boston.

President Eisenhower reveals that he will offer Congress a balanced budget for 1960 "in the general area of \$77,000,000,000."

Dec. 26—William L. Mitchell is named by President Eisenhower as Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.

Dec. 27—President Eisenhower approves the creation of a Federal Council for science and technology, an interdepartmental coordinating committee to work out long-range government policy. It will be headed by Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., special assistant to the President for science and technology.

### Labor

Dec. 1—Striking transport workers tie up 72 ships flying "flags of convenience."

Dec. 3—Northern soft coal operators sign a new contract with the United Mine

Workers after long private negotiations. Miners will receive an additional \$1.20 daily.

Dec. 4—17,200 employees of the Chrysler Corporation are out of work because of a labor dispute.

The Southern Coal Operators sign a new contract with the United Mine Workers providing a \$2 a day wage increase.

Dec. 5—Postmaster General Arthur E. Summerfield tells a meeting of the National Association of Manufacturers that the President plans to support new legislation curbing labor unions.

Dec. 8—In New York state, the State Federation of Labor and the State C.I.O. vote to merge after 23 years of separation.

Trans-World Airlines begins operations again; Eastern Airlines remains strike bound.

Dec. 9—George Meany, president of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. says that labor may have to form a third political party.

Dec. 10—Walter Reuther opposes a political party for labor.

Nine New York city newspapers are strikebound. *The Daily News* discontinues publication.

Dec. 11—All major New York city newspapers stop publishing as the deliverymen's strike continues.

Federal Judge F. Dickinson Letts tells the Teamsters to follow the monitors' clean-up directives.

Dec. 20—Striking pilots numbering some 1,500 shut down American Airlines.

Dec. 28—The New York newspapers deliverers' strike ends. Deliverers will receive an increase of \$7 weekly over a two-year period, including \$5.30 in wages and \$1.70 in extra sick leave and an additional holiday with pay.

Dec. 29—New York's newspapers resume publication.

Dec. 31—Flight engineers at Eastern Airlines sign a contract to end a 38-day strike.

### Military

Dec. 1—Major General Alvin R. Luedecke becomes general manager of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The Army reports that a target flying

more than 12 miles high faster than 1500 miles an hour has been destroyed by a Nike Hercules anti-aircraft missile.

Dec. 3—President Eisenhower issues an executive order transferring the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at Pasadena to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; the Army continues to direct the Ballistic Missile Agency under Dr Wernher von Braun.

Dec. 6—The Army's first lunar rocket attempt fails. Pioneer III reaches about 66,000 miles out into space.

Dec. 12—Air Force plans for a long-range ground to air decoy missile, "the Goose," are abandoned.

Dec. 13—An Army Jupiter missile carries a monkey 300 miles into space; the nose cone carrying the monkey returns and is lost in the Atlantic ocean.

Dec. 16—The Air Force fires two 1500-mile Thors; they are unofficially said to have landed within five miles of their targets.

Dec. 18—The Navy reveals plans to reduce programs in 17 states eliminating some 9 thousand civilian employees in the next few years. The Regulus II guided missile program is also cancelled.

A four-ton Air Force Atlas satellite is shot into orbit. Its estimated life-span is 20 days.

Dec. 19—The Atlas missile satellite broadcasts a recorded message from President Eisenhower.

Dec. 20—The 90-foot long ICBM Titan fails on its first attempted launching. The Titan is planned as a successor to the Atlas.

Dec. 24—President Eisenhower names Dr. Herbert F. York of the Defense Department to direct all research and engineering for the Pentagon.

The Air Force says that the Atlas ICBM is now an effective military weapon with a range of at least 6,000 miles; it is expected to be ready for combat use in 1959.

Dec. 27—Defense Department officials reveal that B-58 jet bomber production has been cut from a scheduled 77 for 1959 to "about 70."

Dec. 28—The Atomic Energy Commission releases a quarterly report showing that the fall-out of radioactive strontium in-

creased 25 per cent in New York city in the first eight months of 1958.

#### Politics

Dec. 7—The Democratic Advisory Council drafts a civil rights program suggesting checks on filibustering and effective civil rights legislation.

#### Segregation

Dec. 1—Arthur S. Flemming, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, says that school closings to avoid integration have already caused a loss of more than a million student-days.

Dec. 3—A spokesman for the Civil Rights Commission says that members of the commission will stay at Maxwell Air Force Base instead of Montgomery hotels when they visit there because no unsegregated accommodations are available.

#### Supreme Court

Dec. 8—The Court votes 5 to 3 that natural gas pipeline companies using the common form of contract may raise rates under a short-cut rate provision of the Natural Gas Act.

Dec. 15—The Supreme Court rules 7 to 2 that Federal District Courts may review decisions of the National Labor Relations Board relating to the composition of a collective bargaining unit, so called certification rulings.

#### VENEZUELA

Dec. 7—Venezuelans vote for president, congress, and state and municipal elections.

Romulo Betancourt, presidential candidate of the Democratic Action Party, leads.

Dec. 10—Betancourt's victory is conceded by his opponents, and he opens negotiations on forming a coalition government of national unity, as promised by all 3 candidates.

Dec. 20—A new tax program is announced whereby the government will collect 60 per cent of profits earned by oil companies.

#### YUGOSLAVIA (See also *Indonesia*.)

Dec. 1—President Tito begins a tour through Asia and Africa.

Dec. 22—The U.S. and Yugoslavia sign an agreement permitting the Yugoslavs to purchase \$95 million of surplus agricultural goods.

# WALL MAPS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

For teachers, lecturers, students. We have a considerable variety of Near and Middle East maps. They vary in content and in size. They are available in various mountings. The character of the mounting, as well as the size, determines the price.

P47r—Near & Middle East—Land of the Five Seas. A physical-political map. Size 36 x 48 inches. Scale 64 inches to one inch.

HPe83—Near East & India. Physical-Political. Size 90 x 66 inches. Scale 48 miles to the inch. (Haack)

HA83—Near East. Physical-Political. Size 86 x 72 inches. Scale 24 miles to one inch. (German text)

PS8—Modern Palestine. Physical-Political. Size 36 x 48 inches. Scale 5 miles to inch.

PS8h—Israel. Physical-Political. Size 36 x 48 inches. Hebrew text. Scale 5 miles to inch.

BW47r—Middle East. Physical-Political. Size 40 x 30 inches. A detailed reference map. Scale 64 miles to inch.

S47r—Middle East. Political (1950). Size 44 x 28 inches. Scale 55 miles to inch. A detailed reference map.

J4vr—Africa and the Near East. Visual-Relief map, 44 x 58 inches. New!

MIT10—Partition of Palestine, 1947. Black and white map 44 x 64 inches.

MIT6—The Middle East, 1950. Black and white map 44 x 64 inches.

*Your discussions become more interesting and vital if your speakers are backgrounded by maps germane to the issues. Write*

## DENOYER - GEPPERT COMPANY

PUBLISHERS • IMPORTERS • EXPORTERS • MAP MOUNTERS

MAPS      GLOBES      ATLASES

5235 RAVENSWOOD AVENUE

CHICAGO 40, ILL.

These **CURRENT HISTORY** issues  
are available for quantity purchase.

**Use this check list to order for your classes . . .**

#### Problems in World Affairs

- Communist China's Foreign Policy (12/57)
- The Soviet Union, 1958 (1/58)
- The Middle East (11/57)
- Underdeveloped Areas and Foreign Aid (8/57)
- Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (9/57)
- The World of Islam (6/57)
- France in Africa (2/58)
- West Europe Today and Tomorrow (11/56)
- France's Foreign Policy (5/55)
- Report on Germany (4/56)
- Canada (7/55)
- The Mediterranean World (8/55)
- Great Britain: Education at Mid-Century (9/58)
- Report on Latin America (4/57)
- The Far East in the Free World (5/56)
- United States Foreign Policy (3/58)
- Tensions in America (3/58)
- Report on Japan (4/57)
- Tensions in the Soviet Union (6/58)

- Report on Communist China (12/58)
- Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R. (1/59)
- Nationalism in the Middle East (2/59)
- India Between East and West (coming 3/59)
- Tensions in East-Central Europe (coming 4/59)

#### Problems of American Democracy

- United States Through Foreign Eyes (12/56)
- Dilemma of Empire (12/55)
- American Farm Leaders (6/55)
- Disarmament and Defense (10/57)
- Changing American Politics (8/56)
- Public Power in the U. S. (5/58)
- Integration: The South's Historic Problem (5/57)
- Education in Crisis (9/55)
- Security in a Free Society (10/55)
- Immigration and the American Ideal (11/55)
- The Changing American South (11/58)

Our

Because these studies are so  
rates for group use:

In orders of 5 or more, copies  
at 35c a copy; in orders of 30 or  
25c a copy. Single copy price, 65c

We also offer reduced rates for subscriptions: in orders of 10 subscriptions  
or more, your students may subscribe for 9 months at \$3.15; or for 12 months at \$4.20;  
in orders of 30 or more, our 9-month rate is \$2.70; 12 months, \$3.60; in orders of 100  
or more, our 9 month rate is \$2.25 and our 12 month rate is \$3.00. The cost of a  
single subscription is \$5.25 for 9 months; \$7.00 a year.

Rates . . .

offering them at special reduced

a copy; in orders of 10 or more,  
; in orders of 100 or more, at  
ons on orders over 200.

CH S-60 RES 7-7-55  
BLUE MOUNTAIN COLLEGE  
LIBRARY MOUNTAIN MISS

CH259

**CURRENT HISTORY**

**108 Walnut Street**

**Philadelphia 6, Penna.**

I understand that I may order copies of these coordinated issues in quantity at special reduced rates.  
Please send me the issues I have indicated, in the quantities I have marked.

Name ..... ☐ Check enclosed  
Address ..... ☐ Bill me  
City ..... State ..... ☐ 1 Year \$7 ☐ 2 Years \$13